

What is real and not real in the British use of Soviet double agents?

by Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.

On Sept. 12, 1985, the British government announced that Soviet diplomat Oleg Gordievsky, reportedly a senior KGB official, had defected to the West. Subsequently, a reported 25 Soviet spies in Britain were expelled from that nation. In reprisal, it was announced on Sept. 14, that 25 British officials had been deported from the Soviet Union; to this, the British replied by ordering the deportation of an additional 6 Soviet officials.

The affair has overtones from a Graham Greene spy-novel, with a dash or two of Gogol's famous novel, *Dead Souls*, added in. The British leaked the information, that the Soviet KGB's Mr. Gordievsky had been assisting British intelligence during many months prior to the defection, and that the defection had been prompted by the imminent and ominous prospect of Mr. Gordievsky's return to Moscow. On Sept. 12, it was reported that Danish circles objected to this aspect of the British account; Danish sources claimed that Mr. Gordievsky had been working for Danish intelligence during an extended period prior to his posting to London. Presumably, at some date, Mr. Gordievsky will be delivered to the Central Intelligence Agency, which will spend the next several years running polygraph, PSE, EEG, and, perhaps, ESP tests, attempting to assess the sincerity of each among the nouns, verbs, and prepositions uttered by the shopworn Mr. Oleg Gordievsky.

Everyone, or nearly everyone, who is familiar with the spook trade, is very, very cynical about the perennial latest defector from the Soviet KGB, and suspicious of nearly all important defectors of Soviet or East German nationality who have "come over" since the immediate aftermath of the 1953 general strike in East Germany. Specialists are most suspicious of those brought out of the East by British and Israeli

intelligence channels, especially channels linked to the Chekist "Trust's" Armand Hammer. The Soviets and East Germans have very elaborate and well-designed training and conditioning programs, developed for conditioning and selecting from the ranks of their own agents numbers qualified for "defection" to the West. Also, the pharmacopeia being what it is these days, any Soviet official grabbed on the streets, might be transformed into a superficially credible defector, for purposes of brief press conference appearances, within about 48 to 72 hours, and prepared for a more polished-up performance of the role over a period of weeks under "intensive debriefings." In addition, Soviet defectors are a political commodity often used by British and Israeli intelligence as part of an effort to manipulate U.S. policy-shaping perceptions. Any time U.S. intelligence receives such a "package," hairs bristle on the backs of necks. Chances are, 8 or more on a scale of 10, either the Soviet KGB or one of our ever-loving allies is using this piece of merchandise to plant some deception in our ranks. One can not ignore what the "package" reports, but the risk of believing what is reported usually outweighs the gains which might be had.

So, we must not be astonished, to discover that our intelligence professionals are much less exuberant about the latest Soviet "bundle from Britain" than the editors of the British and U.S. press.

The case of 'Double Agent X'

Some of the problems faced by U.S. debriefers are efficiently summed up by the following, strictly hypothetical, case of a Soviet defector designated as "Double Agent X."

"Double Agent X" begins his career as a defector, as a rising young Soviet KGB official is instructed that he is being

considered for a critical promotion, leading to assignment in some Third World or OECD country. In order to qualify for this advantageous promotion, the candidate must pass a most rigorous program of training and testing at a special school in Russia, Bulgaria, or perhaps the special center at Leipzig, in East Germany. The candidate knows that he is about to be subjected to a ferociously brutal sort of security check, probing deep into his background and his inner state of mind; he knows that this will involve subjecting him to a simulated capture and interrogation by Western intelligence agencies.

During the grueling interrogation, the candidate is accused of receiving a very sensitive secret of the Soviet state from an acquaintance of his. This acquaintance, he is informed, is a traitor. The candidate knows the alleged acquaintance casually, but actually knows nothing of the state secret he is alleged to have received through this channel. The simulated interrogation no longer appears simulated to the candidate. The candidate senses this is no play, but a deadly serious interrogation which might end with his own summary execution under torture. Pharmacopeia and physical brutality are combined during this protracted interrogation.

Later, he spends some time on foreign assignment, and is set up to defect by the KGB. He does not defect because he believes that the West is the "wave of the future." On the contrary, the Soviets are confident that the defeat of the politically and morally irresolute West is only a matter of time. He defects to save his neck, and offers himself to his Western contact in the manner of a man plunging through the nearest window, to escape from a burning house.

His defection itself, is quite sincere, but he tells what he knows, and also what he does not know, very slyly. He is a desperate man, terribly alone among hostile strangers. He gives a little, and holds back much, at each step of his processing by Western intelligence, trading for what he believes to be his best advantage.

In the process, he is also conditioned, both wittingly and unwittingly, by the successive arrays of his Western interrogators. Sometimes, those interrogators condition him wittingly, to put his story in the form which will help in influencing the policy-shaping perceptions of some Western government. In this way, he is used to help build a case for some proposed or extant policy of a Western government, or to cast suspicion against some figure of the West.

At the same time, the defector is watching his interrogators closely, to discover what they might wish to hear. The feral individual is trading for personal prestige and advantage, and will naturally use his KGB training and experience to guide him in fabricating the sort of story which will serve his personal cause.

Naturally, he holds back for the last whatever facts he has which he believes to have the greatest value. The "state secret" remembered from his moment of greatest fear at the training-center, ranks very high among the facts he esteems

as having exceptional trading-value.

The "state secret" planted upon him at the training-center, may coincide implicitly with something leaked by the Soviets through a different channel, perhaps a "back-channel." "Double Agent X's" revelations will appear to complete the "jigsaw puzzle." So, the defector's most sincerely-told "state secret," works to cause the Western agencies to delude themselves.

That is only an hypothetical case, but it contains many of the very much real-life ingredients of the case of defectors whom the Soviets have deliberately planted on the West. It illustrates a number of the reasons that senior U.S. intelligence officials do not jump for joy each time our British or Israeli allies share their Soviet defectors with us.

Factors of 'defection'

Ask yourself: "What is the psychological factor which keeps a Soviet KGB or East German Stasi 'sleeper' faithful to the East over decades of inactivity?" Imagine, the case of the West German, French, British, or U.S. businessman, or some slowly rising official of government or business, with no visible connections to the Eastern services, who is nothing but a typically capitalist conservative during two or three decades, but who is all the while waiting for the signal which activates him to act in the Soviet interest? This fellow may be your next-door-neighbor, your employer, or even an official of your political party or government. He might be one of the FBI agents at the nearest office. What keeps this sort of "sleeper" loyal to the KGB over these decades?

Of course, he knows that he will be killed instantly, if he fails to keep his commitment, and he is assured that among his day-to-day associates there is at least one, another sleeper, who will carry out the execution if ordered to do so, but who does not suspect yet that the first sleeper has any links to the KGB. He knows or strongly suspects, that his success in business or career has been helped by invisible hands. He knows or suspects potential KGB blackmail. These factors are more or less universal factors in KGB control over a sleeper, but they are not the fundamental factor of psychological control.

The essential psychological factor controlling the deeply planted Soviet "sleeper," over decades, is the conviction that the Soviet empire will ultimately dominate the world. He was recruited as a sleeper, by being assured that his name would be registered in the honor roll of future world socialism. If he is an American, he might be a second- or third-generation ex-Communist, also motivated by desire for revenge against "McCarthyism." Today, he might be a Republican or an ex-Communist variety of right-wing social-democrat, as likely found on the list of Heritage Foundation supporters as anywhere else.

Potentially, this psychological factor cuts both ways. The ideal Soviet defector, is one who believes that the culture of the West is the "wave of the future," who believes that Rus-

sian culture is inferior to the classical culture of Germany and the Italian Renaissance. Up to the middle of the 1960s, such beliefs among Soviet defectors might still have been credible, but certainly less so after the developments of 1972-77. The collapse of Western military superiority, the process of U.S. strategic decoupling from Western Europe and the Pacific, and such phenomena as the majority support for the Soviets' 1982-launched "nuclear freeze" movement in the U.S. Congress, assure all leading strata of Soviet society that the West is doomed, and the Soviet empire "the wave of the future."

Genuine Soviet defectors of the more recent period, are just as convinced of the inevitable doom of the West as those who stay behind. They defect for reasons of personal expediency: Better to live the remaining years of one's life comfortably in the doomed West, than to be a tortured corpse in a KGB grave in victorious Russia.

The most obvious variety of the defectors which the KGB plants on the West, for purposes of deception, are those who tell a tale of a Soviet "crumbling empire." A defector might tell such a tale, either because he does so wittingly as part of the KGB's deception-campaign bearing upon Western "arms-control" policy, or because he is passed through the hands of Western intelligence factions representing the interests of McGeorge Bundy's and Kissinger's faction in the West. Our intelligence services must discredit any defector who supplies information tending to support the KGB's "crumbling empire" deception.

Even the defector who insists that the Soviet empire is in a pre-war mobilization cannot be trusted merely because he tells the truth on that account. The defector must supply information leading to the highest-quality of corroboration of some fact which would otherwise not be known to us. We can not trust coherent verbal reports, even if supported by official documents; we must have physically verifiable sorts of important information, the kind of information which no mere deception can orchestrate to appear credible.

Problems of U.S. intelligence

Overall, we need, most urgently, a major overhaul and expansion of the "human intelligence" capabilities of the CIA's Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence sectors, aided by liaison with specialist scientific task-forces. To get out of the Graham Greene nightmare illustrated by the recent Oleg Gordievsky case, we must end the reliance on second-hand intelligence from British and Israeli sources, and rebuild the sovereign intelligence capabilities of the United States. We must end our dependency upon the tea-leaf readers of our Liberal Establishment "think-tanks," and their glossy commentaries on the linguistic details of the latest defector's case, and reorient our intelligence to concentrating on the kinds of facts which fit the actual nature of Soviet operations against the West.

The British Establishment's policy on sharing intelligence with the United States, since 1938, has been to main-

tain the "special relationship," a "special relationship" more frankly described by the slogan, "British brains, American brawn." They tell us what they believe we ought to know, in our assigned capacity as errand-boy for British policy-interests.

The Israeli situation is somewhat complicated. First of all, Israel's essential strategic policy is the expansion and survival of Israel through practice of Byzantine cabinet-diplomacy, tilting toward the Soviets or the U.S.A. to the degree that either appears to be gaining or losing hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean. Secondly, as Israel's President Chaim Herzog has warned publicly, Israel is on the edge of being taken over by a "parallel Mossad," controlled by Soviet agent Armand Hammer and such Hammer accomplices as Edgar Bronfman and Henry A. Kissinger: Thus, the so-called "Zionist Lobby" in the United States is becoming presently the greatest immediate danger to Israel, as U.S. backing for the fascist and terrorist Meir Kahane illustrates the point.

A case in point, is the growth of the deployment of Sikh terrorists in the Western Hemisphere, a growth which is becoming the leading element of Soviet-directed terrorism throughout the Hemisphere. Although the Sikh terrorist operation is primarily controlled jointly by complicit elements of the British Establishment and the Soviet Tashkent center, the "parallel Mossad" is deeply involved. This includes the cases of Rabbi Morton Rosenthal, Jon Speller, with support from the network of Joel Lisker, Herb Rommerstein, John Rees, et al. in the United States, and massive cover-up of both Kahane's terrorist murderers and the Sikh terrorists by Oliver "Buck" Revell's FBI.

The operating bases of the Sikh terrorists in the Western Hemisphere, are Canada and Ecuador. With the crackdown on drug trafficking in Colombia and Peru, since President Alan García's inauguration, the cocaine traffic out of South America has shifted significantly to Ecuador, where this interfaces the "Sikh terrorist" government-in-exile recently established there with Israeli intelligence assistance. In India, the Sikh terrorists are financed largely through proceeds from drug traffic and drugs-for-weapons deals. In the Western Hemisphere, this intersects the cocaine trafficking of Robert Vesco, Fidel Castro, and Carlos Lehder, a network directly interfaced with U.S. attorney Kenneth Bialkin, of the ADL's New York law firm, Willkie, Farr, and Gallagher. There is nothing more absurd, than the recent upgrading of the control over U.S. counter-terrorist capabilities by the Mossad, especially to the degree that the associates of Speller, Lisker, Rees, Bialkin, and Bronfman are assisted to gain greater influence by this means.

The harum-scarum character of the latest defector story from London, ought to warn us that we have gone past the limit in relying upon second-hand intelligence from our ever-loving allies. A nation which does not defend itself, including its intelligence defenses, has really no allies at all, in the final analysis.