

The CIA—Only a Caretaker Force

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Journalists and others who obviously have plainly not learned to add and subtract insist that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is still today a dark and devious power in the world. Others suffering the same mental affliction rush about, insisting upon the axiomatic authority of U.S. governmental intelligence sources in matters ranging from canning prunes to the sex life of sundry Tibetan monks.

Beginning with Henry A. Kissinger's assigning James R. Schlesinger to perform the first phase of a wrecking-job on the CIA back during the Nixon Administration, the Agency has undergone successive savage pink-slipping house-cleanings. Added to the current period's wave of retirements of old hands from the OSS and initial CIA years, one may say that the Turner purge of Deputy Director E. Henry Knoche and hundreds of others during the Summer of 1977 essentially finished off the last major independent capabilities of the CIA as a functioning governmental intelligence agency.

Except for the accumulation of sub-agents, contract sources, and informal connections left over from former periods, every former capability of the Agency has either been eradicated or is rapidly eroding. The once-feared premises at Langley have been degraded to a laundering-agency for British and Israeli intelligence products run through those premises under the direction of Henry A. Kissinger, James R. Schlesinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and anglophile Rhodes scholar and British intelligence (International Institute for Strategic Studies) agent Admiral Stansfield Turner.

Worse than the savage personnel cuts are the supplementary measures employed to prevent anyone in the Agency from even thinking in directions contrary to current Brzezinski assignments and estimates. Without indicating the exact methods employed, it is accurate to state that the internal life of the CIA is totally an Orwellian nightmare, with very effective methods of actual thought control regularly applied to all employees.

What has occurred in this way to the CIA characterizes most of the once-vaunted U.S. intelligence establishment, a sickness currently invading the State Department. *The President of the United States commands presently no competent, independent sources for discovering what is actually occurring in any part of the world on any major issue.* British intelligence operatives

are in controlling positions within vital aspects of U.S. military intelligence, and British and Zionist agents generally have the run of the premises inside the most sensitive aspects of government.

Under these circumstances any foreign government which attributes a significant operation to the initiative of the CIA is simply playing the damned fool. Any member of Congress or the press who gives any *prima-facie* credence to a confidential briefing allegedly based on high-level governmental intelligence sources is playing the fool. There are, admittedly, still capable intelligence specialists—and valuable files—at CIA, in the Department of Justice, and so forth, but virtually none of the executives are rocking the boat currently—they are not even thinking of contradicting Brzezinski, Kissinger *et al.*, and do not wish to gain possession of any facts which might impel them to think of doing so.

The Way It Now Works

Exemplary of what does happen that is credited to U.S. intelligence circles is the case of the discredited Romanian defector, Ion Pacepa.

Two principal facts have come out in connection with that gentleman. First, he is not properly speaking a defector; he was an in-place British spy in the Romanian government, who was pulled out by the British for the purpose of playing-back disinformation planted into him by top circles of the British Secret Intelligence Service. Second, intensive investigation of that British spy's fairy-tales have established that every revelation he purported to make to Washington, D.C. and in West Germany was a lie.

Although the key British sewer-outlet for this deception operation was Robert Moss, the operation was run in West Germany under the Zbigniew Brzezinski label. In other words, Brzezinski was caught red-handed in an effort to destabilize the government of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the head of government of a principal U.S. NATO ally!

The final two straws which broke the back of the U.S. government intelligence capabilities—those surviving the Turner purge of 1977—were Carter Administration directives for the Shaba II and Camp David cases.

The U.S. intelligence community now operates chiefly on hopes of reaching pensionable end-of-service, meanwhile avoiding any hint of an intent to contradict whatever current fantasy the Carter Administration (e.g., Brzezinski) prescribes as adopted fact. The White House, under “Svengali” Brzezinski's direction, declares, “My mind is made up; do not attempt to confuse me by reporting reality.” The intelligence establishment gets in line.

Everyone in positions of power throughout the world—except the U.S. government—knows that the Camp David proceedings rank with Chamberlain's follies at Munich as the worst

diplomatic fiasco of the 20th century. Any evidence which contradicts the virtues of Emperor Brzezinski's Camp David "new suit of clothes" is hysterically avoided or simply deprecated as "smokescreen" or "Soviet propaganda" by the Administration and its intelligence arms. Menachem Begin runs Israel, and Moshe Dayan runs the United States.

But the CIA Was Bad

Admittedly, the CIA has a small constituency. The only case in which a former CIA operative has been slapped hard for allegedly lampooning his former employer is Frank Snepp—and Snepp revealed not a single CIA secret. The difference is that Snepp attacked Henry A. Kissinger in a serious competent way. Flagrant violator Philip Agee, who has been involved in setting up CIA operatives for assassinations, walks about quite unprosecuted, while Snepp languishes under judgment. The books of various former intelligence operatives are each filled with hundreds or thousands of names. This and that is "blown" in batches with each new publishers' listing cycle. Yet, only Snepp—who rightly and effectively damned Kissinger—was placed under onerous judgment.

One can kick the CIA, urinate on it several times daily. Such things pour out every day, like rain during the Bengal monsoons. As long as no one does an effective job on Henry A. Kissinger, all such antics have been generally admired.

"But," the argumentative voice pipes up, "look at what the CIA used to do..."

As a political historian, and recently advantaged to discuss relevant matters of wartime and postwar history with persons most advantageously situated to view dark proceedings, I have probably as good a sense of what the CIA's covert operations (and related) institutions have done as anyone outside the intelligence community proper. I do not need to be informed of such matters at this juncture. What I do not know in one way or another, I am fully capable of assuming among might-have-beens.

The issue is not what the CIA did or did not do. The issue is whether the U.S.A. requires a central intelligence agency as a source of information bearing on policy decisions and as a counterintelligence arm. The correlated issue is whether qualified professionals are required to staff such an intelligence agency. The issue is not what the CIA did, but what it should be doing.

The issue was pointed up by the proceedings of a most-recent, Ann Arbor, Michigan conference of Morton Halperin's Committee to Stop Government Spying. The Committee, which is so overlapped with Philip Agee's gang of pro-terrorists as to be indistinguishable from a terrorist-support group, underscored its true character by honoring sundry known terrorists and their supporters as the principal sideshow features of the KonKlave.

The Halperin effort, closely intertwined with the Ralph Nader operations, has been a principal stalking horse behind such abominations as the “Levi Guidelines” and the White House’s own gag-rule against any U.S. counterintelligence general surveillance of British, Canadian and Israeli intelligence agents’ (and assassins’) deployment in the United States. The Halperin-Nader-Agee cabal is the essence of the wrecking of the U.S. intelligence community begun by Schlesinger, and the names and antics of Halperin, Nader and Agee ought to warn a too-credulous public of its folly in cheering the demise of the “bad CIA.”

Halperin’s—like Nader’s—group makes it clear that their included purpose, and prominently so, is to prevent the people of the United States from enjoying the slightest degree of effective intelligence-counterintelligence protection against the wave of international terrorism British intelligence warns it is about to unloose in this country.

At this moment, even minor foreign powers have justification for joining the ranks of those nations who presently view the U.S.A.’s intelligence facilities as the laughingstock of the world. It was not so much Halperin, or Nader, or Agee who did this. It was Kissinger, Schlesinger, Brzezinski and Turner—with aid and assistance from such foreign powers as the British government and Zionist agencies.

Oh, but were I given a suitable mandate and backing from Congress, I would pull together an effective overall U.S. intelligence capability within weeks. Who, every concerned citizen may well ask, will in fact do it—before it is too late?