

The LaRouche Doctrine: Draft Memorandum of Agreement between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R.

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Author's Note: No person, and no government, could possibly foresee what the world will look like at the moment of the next inauguration of the President of the United States. The world is stumbling around at the brink of a financial collapse worse than that of 1931. The strategic crisis is almost running out of control. Entire nations are either disappearing into chaos or threatened with such destruction. Neither I nor any other presidential candidate could predict exactly what he or she would do at the time of the January 1985 inauguration.

Nonetheless, I can say very precisely what I would do were I President today. It is a policy which I heartily recommend to President Ronald Reagan. If I become President in January 1985, this policy expresses the principles I would apply to whatever circumstances I faced at that time.

Essentially, strategy is not a military question, but a political and economic question. When politics and economics fail to avoid war, military means adequate to such a purpose must bring matters as quickly as possible to a peace, a peace defined in political and economic, not military terms. Thus, the strategic military policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union must be a military extension of a peace policy, must be an instrument for establishing those political and economic policy-relations between the powers which serve as the basis for durable peace.

The following is a proposed memorandum of agreement between special representatives of the President of the United States and appropriate representatives of the Soviet government. This proposed memorandum addresses the strategic situation as it exists today, it reflects the

same principles which would be embodied in a memorandum composed for the same purpose in January 1985.

—Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr.
March 30, 1984

ARTICLE 1:

General Conditions for Peace

The political foundation for durable peace must be: a) The unconditional sovereignty of each and all nation-states, and b) Cooperation among sovereign nation-states to the effect of promoting unlimited opportunities to participate in the benefits of technological progress, to the mutual benefit of each and all.

The most crucial feature of present implementation of such a policy of durable peace is a profound change in the monetary, economic, and political relations between the dominant powers and those relatively subordinated nations often classed as “developing nations.” Unless the inequities lingering in the aftermath of modern colonialism are progressively remedied, there can be no durable peace on this planet.

Insofar as the United States and Soviet Union acknowledge the progress of the productive powers of labor throughout the planet to be in the vital strategic interests of each and both, the two powers are bound to that degree and in that way by a common interest. This is the kernel of the political and economic policies of practice indispensable to the fostering of durable peace between those two powers.

ARTICLE 2:

Concrete Technological Policy

The term, technology, is to be understood in the terms of its original meaning, as supplied by Gottfried Leibniz, as the French translation of this same term, *polytechnique*, was understood by the Ecole Polytechnique under the leadership of Lazare Carnot and Gaspard Monge, and as the successive discoveries of Carl F. Gauss, Lejeune Dirichlet, and Bernhard Riemann provide an improved comprehension of the mathematical (geometrical) comprehension of Leibniz’s original definition of “technology.”

Technology, so defined, is understood to be the indispensable means not only for increasing the potential relative population-density of societies, but as also indispensable to maintaining even any present level of population potential. Potential relative population density is measured in persons per square kilometer. The increase in potential relative population

density requires both an increase in the usable energy supplies of a society, per capita, and also an increase of the energy-flux density of primary energy supplies, and in the form of application of such energy to various modes of production.

The foundation of development of productive powers of labor in agriculture (broadly defined) and industry (also broadly defined), is the development and maintenance of such elements of basic economic infrastructure as fresh-water management, transportation systems, energy production and distribution, general improvement of the habitability of land-areas, and urban industrial infrastructure of both industries and populations' daily life.

Next, in sequence, is the development of production of raw materials by agriculture and mining-refining. All other physical-goods production depends upon the scale of output and productive powers of labor in these two categories of raw-materials production. Most essential, economically, socially, and politically, is the increase of agricultural yields per hectare and per capita, effected through technological progress in both infrastructure improvement and in modes of production employed.

Since developments during the 15th century in Europe, all advances in technology, all advances in the productive powers of labor have been based on the development of the machine, or on the design of processes analogous to the functions of the heat-powered machine in terms of other subspecies of physical principles, such as chemistry, biology, the development of electrical energy supplies, and the emerging role of productive processes based on principles of plasma physics. "Technology," as comprehended from the combined standpoints of Gauss, Dirichlet, and Riemann, treats each of these varieties of production-methods as subsumed by a common set of principles.

In all aspects of production excepting agriculture, and in respect to industrial goods required by agricultural production, advances in technology are transmitted into the productive process as a whole through the incorporation of improved technologies in capital goods, most emphatically capital goods of the machine-tool or analogous classifications. Therefore, the only means by which a national economy can sustain significant rates of technological progress, is by placing emphasis upon the capital-goods sector of production, and maintaining sufficiently high rates of turnover in that sector to foster high rates of technological innovation in the goods produced.

It follows that general increase of the productive powers of labor requires relatively high rates of investment of technologically progressive forms of such capital goods per capita in all spheres of production.

Therefore, the general advancement of the productive powers of labor in all sovereign states, most emphatically so-called developing nations, requires global emphasis on: a) increasing

globally the percentiles of the labor force employed in scientific research and related functions of research and development: a goal of 5% of the world's labor force so employed is recommended as a near- to medium-term goal; b) increasing the absolute and relative scales of capital-goods production and also the rate of turnover in capital-goods production; and c) combining these two factors to accelerate technological progress in capital-goods outputs.

Therefore, high rates of export of such capital-goods output to meet the needs of developing nations are indispensable for the general development of so-called developing nations: Our common goal, and our common interest, is promoting both the general welfare and promoting preconditions of durable peace between our two powers.

The foreseeable direction of advances in technology over the span of the coming 50 years or longer is already clear in categorical terms of reference. There are clearly three general categories of scientific and technological progress on which humanity must rely into the period to come: a) very high energy-flux density, controlled thermonuclear plasmas, typified by the development of "commercial" fusion-energy production as the emerging, principal source of energy supplies for mankind, both on Earth and in exploration and colonization of nearby space; b) the application of energy supplies in the modes of coherent, directed-energy radiation, illustrated by the case of high-powered laser and so-called particle-beam modes; and c) new directions in biology, for which microbiotechnology is but a subordinated, but important aspect.

These three areas of technological breakthroughs define the role of powered, extended interplanetary and related forms of space travel, and of preconditions for life in synthetic, Earth-simulated environments of growing populations in colonies on the Moon, Mars, and elsewhere during the course of the coming 50 years.

Scientific cooperation in the development of these breakthroughs, and in respect to their applications to production and to exploration of nearby space, is an area in which the two powers must promote efficient cooperation between themselves, and with other sovereign states.

ARTICLE 3: Economic Policies

By supplying increased amounts of high-technology capital goods to developing nations, the exporting economies foster increased rates of turnover in their own most advanced capital-goods sectors of production. As a by-product of such increased rates of turnover in that sub-sector of the exporting nation's production, the rate of improvement of technology in such

categories of goods is increased, with great benefits to the internal economy of the exporting nation. Thus, even were the exporting nation to take no profit on such exports, the promotion of higher rates of capital turnover in the capital-goods sector of that exporting nation would increase the productive powers of labor in the exporting nation's economy as a whole, thus supplying great benefit to the exporting nation's economy in that way.

The importer of such advanced capital goods increases the productive powers of labor in the economy of the importing nation. This enables the importing nation to produce its goods at a lower average social cost, and enables it to provide better-quality and cheaper goods as goods of payment to the nations exporting capital goods.

Not only are the causes of simple humanity and general peace served by such policies of practice; the arrangement is equally beneficial to exporting and importing nations. Only a profound ignorance of true interests of nations could desire any contrary policy of practice respecting "technology transfer."

Moreover, the general rate of advancement of the productive powers of labor is most efficiently promoted by no other policy of practice.

ARTICLE 4: International Monetary Policy

The only equitable and workable relations in financing of world trade among sovereign states with different economic and social systems is a system of credit based on fixed parities of national currencies, parities fixed by aid of a gold-reserve monetary order among states.

To prevent a gold-reserve system of fixed parities from becoming subject to disabling inflationary spirals, it is necessary to limit the extension of credit within the monetary system to "hard-commodity" categories of lending for import and export of physical goods. If such world trade emphasizes high proportions of efficiently employed advance-technology capital-goods, the increase of productivity fostered by such trade has a secularly deflationary impact on prices.

In the present situation, in which world trade has been collapsing under pressures caused by pyramiding of refinanced external and domestic indebtedness of national economies, it is necessary to reorganize the present indebtedness, to the effect that low interest rates prevail in the anti-inflationary environment of a gold-reserve system, and that the schedule of repayments of existing, outstanding indebtedness does not consume more than 20% of the export earnings of any of these nations.

The general benefit of such monetary reforms is the creation, immediately, of greatly increased markets for trade in high-technology capital goods.

ARTICLE 5: Military Doctrines

Since the rupture of the war-time alliance between the two powers, U.S. military policy toward the Soviet Union has passed through two phases. The first, from the close of the war until a point beyond the death of Joseph Stalin, was preparation for the contingency of what was sometimes named “preventive nuclear war.” The second, emerging over the period from the death of Stalin into the early period of the administration of President John F. Kennedy, was based on the doctrines of Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response as those doctrines were described in the keynote address by Dr. Leo Szilard at the second Pugwash Conference assembled in Quebec during 1958.

Until President Ronald Reagan’s March 23, 1983 announcement of a new U.S. strategic doctrine, which overthrew the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine, from the time of the Kennedy administration, U.S. military doctrine toward the Soviet Union was more or less exactly that outlined by Szilard’s keynote address at the second Pugwash Conference, of 1958. During the same interval, military negotiations between the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. have been premised on the assumption of continued U.S.A. adherence to the Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response doctrines.

From approximately 1963 until approximately 1977, it might have appeared, as it appeared to many, that the doctrines of Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response had succeeded in preserving a state of restive peace, sometimes called “détente,” between the two powers. This appearance was deceptive; during the period 1977–83, there was an accelerating deterioration in the military relationships between the two powers.

From the side of the United States, the impending breakdown of “détente” was signaled by the 1974 announcement of the so-called Schlesinger Doctrine. In fact, the Schlesinger Doctrine’s perspective of “limited nuclear warfare” between the powers, or their so-called surrogates, was neither violation of the Pugwash Doctrine, nor any innovation within that doctrine. Szilard, in outlining the doctrine in 1958, had already specified that the doctrine required provision for “limited nuclear warfare,” as well as “local warfare” of a colonial-warfare variety.

The Schlesinger Doctrine’s appearance was an embedded feature of Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response from the outset. If the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine were continued, it was

already evident from the time of Szilard's 1958 address, "limited nuclear war" in the European theater was more or less an inevitable outcome.

Beginning shortly after the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter, the deterioration in the military situation accelerated. The Soviet Union's response was typified by the deployment of the SS-20 missiles in Europe, and the 1979 NATO response, prompted by Henry A. Kissinger, to deploy Pershing II and land-based cruise missiles as weapons to be deployed in an effort to induce the Soviet Union to eliminate the SS-20s deployment: the so-called double-track arms negotiations tactic.

As an arms-negotiation tactic, Kissinger's double-track gambit proved substantially less than worthless. Over the interval 1981–83, continuation of the Nuclear Deterrence/Flexible Response doctrine impelled both powers to the verge of the military postures of "Launch Under Attack" and the more ominous posture of "Launch On Warning."

In response to this direction of developments, the U.S. public figure Lyndon H. LaRouche, Jr. proposed that both powers develop, deploy, and agree to develop and deploy "strategic" defensive, anti-ballistic-missile defense based on "new physical principles." This proposal was issued publicly by LaRouche beginning February 1982; he proposed to U.S.A., Western European, and Soviet representatives that the development and deployment of such strategic defensive systems be adopted policy, as a means for escaping from the "logic" of Nuclear Deterrence.

During a period not later than the 1962 appearance of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky's *Soviet Military Strategy*, leading Soviet circles had recognized the dangerous fallacies of Nuclear Deterrence/Flexible Response. Beginning with the publication of that text, leading Soviet military specialists and others correctly assessed the incompetence of the Nuclear Deterrence/Flexible Response doctrine from a military vantage-point, although no comparable assessment appeared as part of U.S.A. military doctrine until President Reagan's announcement of March 23, 1983.

In that sense, LaRouche's proposed strategic doctrine, as first announced publicly in February 1982, was congruent with the analysis first publicly offered by Marshal Sokolovsky in 1962. LaRouche's, and, later, Dr. Edward Teller's and President Reagan's proposal of "Mutually Assured Survival," implicitly put both powers on the footing of identical military doctrines: LaRouche's doctrine, and President Reagan's, are properly judged to be U.S. versions of the Sokolovsky doctrine.

The leading objections raised, first, against LaRouche's proposal, and, later, the similar proposals of Dr. Teller and President Reagan, centered upon the observation that abandonment of Nuclear Deterrence/Flexible Response implied a new technological arms

race centered around the development of layered ballistic missile defense. Examining the fallacy of that objection points toward the necessary changes in the military policy governing relevant negotiations between the two powers.

As key architects of Nuclear Deterrence, notably Bertrand Russell and Leo Szilard, emphasized most strongly during the 1950s and later, their purpose in proposing Nuclear Deterrence was to further Russell's feudalistic, utopian dream of creating an agency of world-government which would enjoy monopoly of use and possession of means of warfare, including a monopoly of nuclear arsenals. Given the reality of Soviet development of nuclear arsenals, Russell *et al.* abandoned their earlier policy of "preventive nuclear warfare." They proposed to divide the world, at least temporarily, between what were proposed to be in effect, two world empires, an eastern and western division of the world between two "empires."

Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response were presented by Russell *et al.* as means for making general thermonuclear warfare between the two principal powers "unthinkable." The ability of either power to assure the annihilation of the other was argued to represent physical means for ensuring the preservation of the "two-empire" system. Flexible Response was added, to provide means for military adjustments, including local, and limited-nuclear warfare, without risking the escalation of such wars to general thermonuclear warfare.

History shows that such schemes are inherently unworkable. Exemplary is the case of the plan to divide the Persian Empire into two parts, Eastern and Western Divisions, during the fourth century B.C. Also exemplary is the effort of the Venice-centered European "black nobility" to orchestrate balance of power among the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires, during the interval 1453–1914 A.D. The very logic of such attempted arrangements ensures wars leading to the destruction of one or all of the contending powers. Such is proving to be the case for the doctrines of Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response, respecting the deteriorating situation between the Atlantic and Warsaw Pact alliances.

It is the nature of competently elaborated military capabilities of major powers that those capabilities must be developed and prepared to ensure the survival and victory of the power in case of war with the opposing power. At the point that continuation of the existing form of peace is perceived to ensure the destruction of one of the powers, that power must either launch war or must accept the destruction of the nation which it represents. Marshal Sokolovsky and his Soviet co-thinkers were obviously correct on this point, and so was LaRouche.

The Nuclear Deterrence and Flexible Response doctrines were worse than merely incompetent. Had the threat of general warfare been perceived during the period beginning

1961–63, as Nuclear Deterrence seemed temporarily to remove that possibility, the powers would have been impelled to seek political and economic alternatives to such threats of general warfare. Instead, the political and economic impulses leading in the direction of warfare were permitted to aggregate. The political and economic impulses toward warfare were offset by adjustments in Nuclear Deterrence postures: including adjustments under the titles of détente generally, and arms-control agreements more narrowly. The unresolved political and economic issues seized upon the embedded logic of Nuclear Deterrence, to drive the powers to the verge of thermonuclear, general warfare.

The assumption prevailed, that as long as political and economic impulses toward general warfare did not surpass the “threshold” of Nuclear Deterrence, that such impulses toward war could be confidently maintained in existence, since neither power, it was assumed, would “dare to resort to the unthinkable” remedy of general thermonuclear warfare. So, under the instruction of such deluded confidence in Nuclear Deterrence, the powers marched blindly toward the brink of general thermonuclear warfare.

If both powers and their allies were to deploy simultaneously the “strategic” and “tactical” defensive systems implicit in “new physical principles,” the abrupt shift to overwhelming advantage of the defense would raise qualitatively the level of threshold for general warfare. This would be the case if defensive systems based on such “new physical principles” effectively deployed into the potential battlefield of Europe, as well as in the form of “strategic” defensive systems. For a significant period of time, the defense would enjoy approximately an order of magnitude of superiority, man for man, over the offense, relative to the previous state of affairs.

This would permit negotiation of a temporary solution to the imminence of a “Launch On Warning” posture by both powers: a solution which might persist for 10, 15 years, or longer. The true solution must be found in the domain of politics and economics, and the further shaping of military relations between the powers must produce military policies by each coherent with the direction of development of the needed political and economic solutions.

Articles 1–4 of this memorandum stipulate the leading, principled features of the required political and economic solutions. If each of the powers adheres to the republican military traditions exemplified by the work of Lazare Carnot and the Stein-Hardenberg reforms in Prussia, and defines its national interests according to the provisions of Articles 1–4, there need be no expectation of warfare between the powers: as warfare is the “continuation of politics by other means.”

On the part of the United States of America, the government is committed to avoiding all colonial, imperial, or kindred endeavors in foreign policy, and to establish, instead, a growing community of principle among fully sovereign nation-states of this planet. This shall become a community of principle coherent with the policies of the articles of this draft memorandum. If any force should endeavor to destroy that community of principle, or any member of that community of sovereign nations, the United States will be prepared to defend that community and its members by means of warfare, should other means prove insufficient. With respect to the Soviet Union, the government of the United States offers the Soviet Union cooperation with itself in service of these principles, and desires that the Soviet Union might enter fully into participation within that community of principle.

ARTICLE 6:

Weapons Policies of the Powers

The distinguishing kernel of most of the defensive weapons systems classed under the title of “new physical principles” is the development of applications of both accomplished and imminent breakthroughs in two of the three general areas of scientific progress to dominate the coming 50 years: controlled, high energy plasmas, and directed-energy applications. The development of these military applications signifies an expansion of the varieties of research and development facilities and staffs occupied with such new technologies. The deployment of weapons systems of this class signifies development of production facilities oriented to these technologies.

The impact of this upon the economies is suggested by the reasonable estimate, that the U.S.A., Western Europe, Japan, and the nations of the Warsaw Pact, will spend aggregately about 1983 three trillion dollars on development of “strategic” and “tactical” systems of this class by approximately the close of the present century, using U.S.A. costs as a standard of estimate. Although this amount is only a large ration of present levels of military expenditures by the same aggregation of states, to concentrate so large a ration of those military allotments upon the frontiers of present science and technology must have a very great impact upon the economies.

The best standard of comparison for estimating the impact of this upon the economies affected is the case of the impact of NASA research and development upon the U.S.A. economy, notably NASA’s phase of intense development through 1966. The impact of the indicated program of high-technology military expenditures would be four to ten times as great as the NASA expenditure of that indicated period.

The impact of these technologies upon the civilian economies is suggested by the fact that the “second generation” of “commercial” fusion power might provide us with energy-flux densities in the order of as much as a half million kilowatts per square meter, in contrast to between 40,000 and 70,000 kilowatts per square meter with best generating modes today. The industrial applications of high-powered lasers, including the important class of “tunable” such lasers, mean leaps in productive powers of labor, reasonably estimated to be as much as a twofold or threefold increase in productivity of U.S. operatives by the year 2000 A.D.

If this connection between military expenditures and civilian benefits is adequately realized, the return to society for such military expenditures will be many times the amount of the military expenditure.

Two conditions must be fulfilled.

First, it must be policy that new such technologies developed in the military area be rapidly introduced into the civilian area.

Second, the rate at which economies can assimilate new technologies is limited by the relative scale of and the rate of capital turnover within the capital-goods sector of production, most emphatically within the machine-tool-grade subsector of capital-goods production.

The second of these conditions can not be adequately fulfilled unless the trend toward “post-industrial society,” of the past eighteen years, is sharply reversed. Although such an urgent change in policy of practice is chiefly a matter of the domestic policy of sovereign nation-states, no sovereign nation-state can adequately pursue the needed policy-changes without very significant degrees of international cooperation.

To accomplish such a shift within sovereign states’ economies, priorities must be set accordingly for investment allocations, in priorities for flows of credit, in relative costs of borrowing by priority categories of investment and employment, and in relative rates of taxation. Similar measures are required in international lending, including relative amounts available for financing international trade, and related extension of credit for investments of importing nations.

It should be general policy, that the goal for employment of operatives in agriculture, mining and refining, industrial production of physical goods, and as operatives developing and maintaining basic economic infrastructure ought to be not less than 50% of the total labor force of nations, and that employment for science and for research and development ought to be not less than five percent of the total labor force of nations. It should be general policy that the percentile of the total labor force employed as operatives in production of consumer goods ought not to increase, but that the increase in supply of consumer goods per capita

should be fostered by high rates of capital investment per operative in such categories of production. In this way, the percentile of the operatives employed in capital-goods production should rise—assuming that not less than 50% of the labor forces are employed as operatives.

Under these conditions, provided that all nations share in development of the frontiers of scientific research, in laboratories and in educational institutions, all nations will be made capable of assimilating efficiently the technological byproduct benefits of the military expenditures on systems derived from application of “new physical principles.”

To lend force to this policy, the powers agree to establish new institutions of cooperation between themselves and other nations in development of these new areas of scientific breakthrough for application to exploration of space.

To this purpose, the powers agree to establish at the earliest possible time institutions for cooperation in scientific exploration of space, and to also co-sponsor treaty-agreements protecting national and multi-national programs for colonization of the Moon and Mars.

At some early time, the powers shall enter into deliberations, selecting dates for initial manned colonization of the Moon and Mars, and the establishment of international space stations on the Moon and in the orbits of Moon and Mars, stations to be maintained by and in the common interest and use of space parties of all nations.

The powers jointly agree upon the adoption of two tasks as the common interest of mankind, as well as the specific interest of each of the two powers: 1) The establishment of full economic equity respecting the conditions of individual life in all nations of this planet during a period of not more than fifty years; 2) Man’s exploration and colonization of nearby space as the continuing common objective and interest of mankind during and beyond the completion of the first task. The adoption of these two working-goals as the common task and respective interest in common of the two powers and other cooperating nations, constitutes the central point of reference for erosion of the potential political and economic causes of warfare between the powers.

ARTICLE 7:

Arms Negotiations Policy

The pre-existing arms-control treaties and related agreements between the two powers are to be superseded by new agreements consistent with the preceding Articles of this draft memorandum.

The existing and future arsenals of so-called “strategic” thermonuclear weapons are to be destroyed as rapidly as deployment of “strategic” defensive weapons systems renders such thermonuclear weapons technologically obsolete as weapons of general assault for general warfare.

On condition that such agreements sought progress as presently anticipated, the powers shall act first to withdraw all thermonuclear weapons in excess of some specified kilotonnage from territories of nations other than their own.

No arms agreement shall be sought whose verifiable adherence requires on-site inspection by personnel of a foreign nation. Rather, both powers and other nations shall be encouraged to deploy such methods of defense by aid of weapons-systems based on new physical principles, that any “cheating” in deploying weapons of assault is virtually nullified by capabilities of the defense.

Progress in implementing the agreements on policy identified in this draft memorandum shall be the precondition for negotiating additional agreements as may be deemed desirable.