

# President Reagan's New Strategic Doctrine as the Alternative to Soviet Thermonuclear Confrontation

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On the 23rd of March this year, President Ronald Reagan informed the world that the United States had adopted a fundamental change in strategic doctrine. Since that date, the United States has been committed to ending more than 20 years of global thermonuclear terror, and to accomplish this by means of developing ballistic-missile-defense systems based on "new physical principles."

As Dr. Jonathan Tennenbaum will indicate some leading technical features of the new weapons-systems to you, both the United States and the Soviet Union are at present in an extremely advanced state of development of defensive weapons systems of greater firepower than any weapons previously in existence. In some cases, working prototypes of such systems have been tested and proven effective in field tests, to the point that their production and installation could proceed more or less immediately. In other cases, these systems have been proven by successful laboratory demonstrations, and could be produced as early as between two and five years. Still other versions are proven to be feasible in terms of principles tested in laboratories, and could be deployed within a period ranging from 5 to 10 years.

Whether such defensive systems could or could not assure us total destruction of all the missiles of a full-scale Soviet strategic assault, for example, is a debatable but useless question. We have the prospect of being able to destroy up to 95 percent or more of intercontinental and intermediate-range thermonuclear ballistic missiles, a ratio which is sufficient to make thermonuclear strategic bombardments technologically obsolete as a primary mode of heavy-artillery bombardment for general warfare. Weapons hitting approximately 10,000 kilowatts of pulsed power, for example, hitting their targets at the speed of light, fire at approximately 100,000 times the speed of a ballistic missile's warhead and 6,000 times or more the speed of

the fastest anti-missile rocket. This is the greatest firepower of any weapons-systems conceived, which enables us to destroy missiles as a fraction of the cost of producing and launching such missiles.

Under conditions of crash-program development, modeled on the accomplishments of the U.S.A.'s NASA work of the 1960s, both the United States and the Soviet Union could have in place a first generation of such new defensive-weapons systems by as early as 1987 or 1988. The net estimate of the cost of deploying such a strategic system is approximately 200 billion 1983 U.S. dollars, a fraction of the present annual military budget of either of the two superpowers. Whether 5 years or 10 years is required to put such a first generation system into place is essentially a matter of the rate at which expenditures are made.

The deployment of such systems would replace the present U.S. nuclear umbrella over Europe, providing Europe for the first time a genuine defense against the destructive force of a Soviet thermonuclear-missile attack, a quality of defense not possible with thermonuclear deterrence. Additionally, nations such as Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, which are prohibited from developing nuclear arsenals of their own, should be encouraged to develop national ballistic-missile-defense systems of their own, especially as what are called point-defense and terminal defense, ground-based laser and particle-beam systems to defend logistical and population-centers against incoming warheads.

The new defensive technologies are not limited to defense against strategic missiles. Laser and related technologies now developed could be manufactured presently for defense of aircraft and naval vessels from tactical air-to-air, surface-to-air, air-to-surface, and surface-to-surface missiles. The same technologies are suited for anti-submarine warfare. These tactical capabilities are of general interest for the air and naval arms, and of emphatic importance for defense of Western continental Europe.

Although the underlying principles of the new strategic and tactical defensive weapons-systems are elementary to contemporary physics, the deployment of such technologies means a sweeping and profound transformation in the design of the arms and conduct of warfare, a change more profound and sweeping than the revolution in warfare which France's Lazare Carnot accomplished around the pivot of improved types of massed fire by mobile field artillery. For the practice of military science, and related matters of defense-policies of governments, the emergence of these new technologies obliges us to return to the kinds of general-staff organization and direction of military arms and logistical capabilities which we associate with the tradition of Carnot and Scharnhorst.

These new technologies, this new strategic doctrine of the United States, means not only an end in sight for more than 20 years of Nuclear Deterrence. It means also an end to toleration

of the doctrines and institutions of so-called "systems analysis" which the U.S. RAND Corporation and Robert S. McNamara's neo-Malthusian "whiz kids" introduced to the U.S.A. and NATO during the 1960s. It means a return to policies of high rates of technological advancement in military science, and a return to strategic policies based on high rates of technological growth in the agriculture, industry, and basic economic infrastructure of nations. It means a reversal of 20 years of growing influence of irrationalism over the cultures and governments of nations, a reversal from cultural pessimism to cultural optimism, a reversal energized by a resurgence of technological optimism, of scientific optimism.

Those, broadly, are the technological features of the new U.S. strategic doctrine and the effects of that doctrine as it is put into general practice. These are matters which will be treated in other aspects of today's conference presentations and discussions. I turn our attention now to the principal topics of my report to you today. From this point onward, I shall situate the new U.S. strategic doctrine in terms of reference of a rapid escalation toward global thermonuclear confrontation now in progress between the Soviet Union and the United States.

To begin, I refer your attention once again to the President's March 23rd address, and also to public statements issued by U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger during the weeks immediately following the President's first announcement of the new doctrine. I focus your attention on the fact that the President and Secretary Weinberger offered to enter into negotiations with the Soviet government, to the purpose of jointly developing such anti-missile defensive systems, and to jointly proceed toward taking down the thermonuclear-missile arsenals terrifying the world today. As you know, the Soviet government abruptly and rudely rejected those offers of negotiation. Then, beginning in August of this year, the Soviet government proceeded to unleash a global pattern of escalating strategic confrontations with the United States, an escalation whose purpose is to bring about a new thermonuclear confrontation with the United States during the first six months of 1984.

In this connection, the time has come for me to report certain facts which have never been made public anywhere up to the moment I speak to you now. Insofar as I either know or suspect what I know to be a secret or privileged matter of the government of the United States, I shall of course say nothing here. However, what I am at liberty to report now will be sufficient to inform you of what European military professionals and other policy-makers need to know as allies of my country.

From February 1982 through the middle of April 1983, I was engaged in continuing private discussions with representatives of the Soviet Union on the subject of the strategic doctrine which the President announced on March 23rd of this year. These discussions were

conducted within the limits of the law of the United States pertaining to such discussions by private citizens. They were, however, conducted with full knowledge of appropriate channels, and the Soviet representatives involved conducted their part of the discussions with full understanding of the arrangement. The limited purpose of these discussions was to explore conceptions with a view to reporting my findings to appropriate channels of my government, and to ensure at the same time that were my recommendations accepted by my government, the Soviet government would have competent knowledge of the intent and implications of the policy being proposed.

Despite the private and informal nature of these fact-finding discussions, the President's announcement of March 23rd caused those discussions to secure the highest strategic importance in Moscow, and to become a significant factor in the unfolding of the global strategic situation after that date. At the same time, these discussions placed me in a situation of special advantage for understanding exactly what the Soviet government was thinking, and its purpose in rejecting the President's offer of negotiations under the new strategic doctrine. As you shall soon learn, this has bearing on the deeper, global implications of recent events in Grenada, and probable new developments about to erupt in various parts of our planet.

### ***Background to the Discussions***

Before turning to those discussions themselves, I must give briefly some of the background to those discussions, and some explanation of the connection between my own formulation of the new U.S. strategic doctrine, at a February 1982 Washington D.C. seminar, and the President's promulgation of his own version of that doctrine this past March 23rd.

There is nothing new in the proposal for development of Ballistic Missile Defense Systems based on lasers and other "new physical principles." Such a proposal first appeared in the published literature in the first, 1962, edition of Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky's famous *Soviet Military Strategy*. From 1962 until the present date, the development of such strategic anti-missile systems has been the center of Soviet war-winning strategy against the West, and is a crucial feature of present Soviet anti-missile deployments in preparation for a thermonuclear showdown as early as the first six months of 1984. This subject was debated in proceedings of the famous Pugwash conference throughout the 1960s. The Soviet commitment to development of such systems was being escalated at the time the 1972 ABM treaty by Henry A. Kissinger—a fact of which Kissinger, but not the U.S. Congress, had knowledge at the time the President and Congress ratified the treaty in the autumn of 1972. During 1977, the issue of Soviet deployment of such anti-missile capabilities was made public by retired Maj.-Gen. George Keegan, with whom some of my associates collaborated at that time, when our experts confirmed General Keegan's views on this matter. During that year, I issued my own first public declaration in support of U.S. development of such systems, for which both I and

General Keegan were roundly denounced in NATO circles by the London International Institute for Strategic Studies.

What was new in my February 1982 proposal for a new U.S. strategic doctrine was not simply my proposal that both superpowers cooperate in developing and deploying ballistic-missile defense based on the so-called “new physical principles.” It was not the development of laser and particle-beam weapons systems which was original in my proposals. What was new was my building around such weapons-systems a comprehensive strategic doctrine proposed to replace and destroy the existing doctrines of Nuclear Deterrence, and to seek to accomplish this by agreement to that effect by both superpowers.

My design for such a new strategic doctrine was completed during the final quarter of 1981, but was withheld from public circulation until my associates and I presented this at a Washington, D.C. seminar we organized for this purpose during February of 1982. We arranged to hold a seminar to be attended by both Warsaw Pact representatives and representatives of the U.S. intelligence, military, and scientific communities. This proposal, once delivered, gained rapid interest and support within influential military and scientific circles in the United States. Exemplary is the formal support it obtained from some retired military professionals during May 1982, and the success of some scientific circles in urging Dr. Edward Teller to become a leading spokesman for such a policy, as may be remembered from Dr. Teller's public address to the Washington D.C. National Press Club on October 5, 1982. Dr. Teller's campaign brought the matter to public controversy in the leading international news-media, and was influential in prompting the adoption of the leading military features of the doctrine by President Reagan.

It is to be emphasized that not all of my design has been adopted by the U.S. government. The kernel of the proposed doctrine was adopted by the President and Secretary Weinberger, as their public statements attest. Also, the President and Secretary Weinberger have made strenuous efforts, as has Dr. Teller, to persuade the Soviet government to cooperate in implementing the new alternative to thermonuclear nightmare. Recently, Dr. Teller has declared publicly his agreement with the proposal to conduct a U.S. economic mobilization like that of 1939–43, which is also an original feature of my February 1982 proposal; however, I doubt that this is yet adopted by the majority of President Reagan's administration—at least, not for 1984. It is clearly the case that President Reagan has not yet accepted my proposal that general international monetary reform must be an integral feature of the new strategic doctrine, although I continue to hope that events will soon convince my government of the need for this change from present policies.

Nonetheless, all of these elements, both those elements presently adopted by my government, and those not adopted so far, were integral features of my discussions with

Soviet representatives, and as elements of those discussions significantly shaped Soviet perceptions of the new strategic doctrine as a whole. From the Soviet vantage-point, the question is whether U.S. policy is dominated by the influence of both Britain's Lord Peter Carrington and Henry Kissinger as well as the Harriman-Rockefeller faction of the Democratic Party, or whether the opposing currents which I typify will tend to prevail in shaping U.S. strategic outlooks. They assume that if the current which I typify prevails, that the entirety of the policies I propose must tend to be influential in U.S. policy, and they are depending upon my leading opponents, such as Kissinger and Walter Mondale, to prevent the influence of my kind of thinking from becoming as influential as Moscow feared it had become on March 23rd. It has been communicated to me from Moscow, that the highest level of the Soviet political command currently views me as Soviet public enemy number one—whether other Soviet circles view me in a more kindly light, I do not know.

### ***The Soviet Discussions***

In any case, the February 1982 seminar led immediately to my direct and indirect discussions with Soviet representatives in various locations. I informed relevant persons in my government of these proceedings, and informed Soviet representatives of this fact. So matters proceeded from February 1982 into the middle of April 1983.

Soviet interest covered two overlapping areas. The first was my proposed strategic doctrine itself. Second, it had come to Soviet attention that my own quarterly forecasts for the U.S. economy, regularly published since November 1979, had proven consistently accurate, whereas their own, as well as those of the U.S. government and private forecasting services generally, had been usually wrong, and overall absurd when compared with my results. As it turned out, it was Soviet belief that my economic analysis of the proposed strategic doctrine was correct which played a leading part in Moscow's summary rejection of the President's proposal of March 23.

The policy discussed with Soviet representatives had the following leading features.

First, the combined Soviet and NATO deployment of what are called Forward Nuclear Defense capabilities, including the Soviet SS-20s and Pershing IIs, had brought the world to the brink of policies of "launch on warning." Whenever one superpower places a first-strike nuclear-assault capability within 10 minutes or less of targets in the opposing superpower's homeland, the threatened power is forced to adopt a policy of launching a full-scale thermonuclear barrage against the homeland of the other at the first indication of launch of forward-based systems. Since Defense Secretary James Schlesinger's announcements of 1974 and Henry A. Kissinger's proposing the NATO double-track policy in 1979, the world has been moving at an accelerating rate toward a condition of "launch on warning." At present,

the Soviet command is virtually at a state of launch-on-warning, and will be at that state by the end of the present year. When the Soviet forces take indicated countermeasures targeting the U.S. homeland, and also deploy SS-20s to eliminate the U.S. nuclear submarine force in a first-strike assault, the United States will be forced to launch on warning. This trend was already clear before the end of 1981, and it was also clear that 1983–84 would be the point at which such a state would emerge.

The point has been reached, at which any continuation of the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine means a high probability for thermonuclear war during the months ahead.

Second, in face of this indicated problem, the present form of strategic-arms-limitation negotiations is premised on negotiating the level of thermonuclear-deterrent capabilities. Therefore, such negotiations perpetuate the very doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence which is now leading us into thermonuclear general warfare. Such negotiations, involving agreements on which the Soviet command will merely continue to cheat as it has over the past 10 years, increase the danger of thermonuclear war by fostering deluded confidence in Nuclear Deterrence.

Third, peace movements today are a more foolish delusion than those of 1912–14 and 1938–39.

In the United States, the Nuclear Freeze movement is sponsored by such names as McGeorge Bundy, Robert S. McNamara, and others of those who guided the United States into the prolonged and useless war in Vietnam. From such “pacifists,” those of us who lived through the 1960s expect nothing but the worst. Our suspicions are well-founded. This same band of peaceniks around Robert S. McNamara has been consistently the leading proponents, together with Henry A. Kissinger, of the most ferocious measures of economic austerity against developing nations generally, policies whose results in terms of famine, epidemics, and social upheavals prompted by misery, presently have literally genocidal effects among some developing nations, and threaten similar effects upon many more. Moreover, these advocates of Nuclear Freeze are leading proponents of local, colonialist wars against developing nations, and are otherwise supporters of various separatist and other “integrist” insurgencies against existing nations of both the developing sector and Europe. The leading cause for strategic instability and war worldwide is the spread of destabilizations throughout Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, the Asian subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. Not only are leaders of the Nuclear Freeze movement the most savage in their actions against developing nations, but their policies for ruin of developing nations are the policies which lead us directly toward general warfare. This is a purported moral insurgency against warfare, led by immoral wretches who support genocidal measures against entire peoples and whose actions can have no result but to lead to general warfare.

At the same time, the peace movement in Western Europe and North America today is either directly orchestrated by the Soviet Union or is conducted by circles acting in collaboration with the Soviet Union. Whether dupes in the West intend this result or not, their actions are in support of a Soviet psychological-warfare effort to weaken the political will of the West in preparation for a thermonuclear confrontation now being mobilized globally by Moscow. The peace movement encourages Moscow to proceed with that confrontation, and thus lures Moscow into those actions which will provoke desperation reactions from a U.S. population which will never permit itself to be subjected to Soviet global hegemony.

These three sets of facts must lead us to the following general conclusion. First, to avoid immediate threats of escalation toward general thermonuclear warfare, we must immediately scrap the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine. The implementation of the President's strategic doctrine will not by itself give us durable peace. It will merely delay the prospect of general warfare by 10 to 15 years, a precious 10 to 15 years, during which to deal with the political causes of the continuing adversary relationship between the superpowers. Second, the delay in danger of general warfare must be used to develop the non-military political solutions which change fundamentally the definition of strategic interests of the powers in a way promoting durable peace.

So far, since the President's address of March 23rd, it has been the first of these two points which has attracted most public discussion. The argument against the President's doctrine has been that the new doctrine destroys the doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence. That is true, of course. The objectors argue that it is the Nuclear Deterrence doctrine which has given us peace, and which is the guarantee of continued peace, an objection which is factually absurd. It is Nuclear Deterrence which has brought the world to the present brink of thermonuclear war.

In my discussions with Soviet representatives, and in other connections, I have been advantaged by the work of my associates and myself in promoting development of controlled thermonuclear fusion technologies. Through this work over the past decade, we were advantaged to know more or less the scientific-technological capabilities of the respective superpowers as those capabilities bear on developing the new kinds of defensive weapons-systems. At the close of 1981, as I shaped the new strategic doctrine, I was advantaged to know that both superpowers had reached the point that both could rapidly develop and deploy the kinds of defensive weapons-systems proposed. Thus, the time had been reached to proceed with destruction of the Nuclear Deterrence policy. It was not only necessary to do so; the time had come when it was practical to do so. No leading Soviet specialist could privately disagree with me on this point.



Some primitive but effective weapons-systems of this new class are more or less immediately available today. Others are provably within reach within 2 to 10 years of development. Therefore, if both superpowers agreed to such a change in strategic doctrine, the agenda of negotiations between them could be profoundly changed. We could scrap the existing form of arms-limitation discussions, and negotiate a new agenda featuring beam-weapons development, and under that agenda negotiate the systematic take-down of the thermonuclear arsenals. Even though several years would be required actually to emplace the new systems in significant degree, the fact that agreement were reached to do so would color the approach to every immediate question in the realm of armaments and strategic issues generally.

The limitation of the causes of warfare requires two broad categories of political cooperation between the two Superpowers.

The first must be cooperation in creating a new global economic order among states, consistent in effect with the 1967 encyclical *Populorum Progressio*. We must replace the bankrupt and oppressive Bretton Woods system with a new global monetary order supplying low-cost, long-term credit for technology transfer to developing nations. This will foster a capital-goods export-boom in industrialized nations, while increasing the productive powers of labor among developing nations. If the United States and the Soviet Union can join to effect what Dr. Teller has called the "common aims of mankind" in this way, that cooperation will contribute greatly to removing the political causes of war.

Such an implementation of *Populorum Progressio* is not to be considered as something merely added onto the strategic doctrine. The new technologies required for defensive weapons-systems represent the greatest technological advance in the productive powers of labor in human existence to date. The mere \$200 billion spent over five years or so, by each superpower in developing the new defensive systems, will be paid back to humanity many times over even during the remaining years of this century, through great advances in the productive powers of labor occurring as these technologies spill over into civilian economy through improved machine tools and other categories of capital goods production.

The second general area of political cooperation must be in the areas of exploration and human colonization of nearby space. This has more direct bearing on the technologies employed in the new defensive weapons-systems, and has profound implications for changing the way in which the human race views itself within our universe.

With or without beam weapons, the progress of science today is more or less entirely centered around a revolution in our knowledge of the laws of our universe emerging from three overlapping areas of fundamental research. The first is a revolution in plasma physics

fostered by advances toward mastery of controlled thermonuclear fusion as the future primary energy source of human existence. The second, somewhat distinct but closely related to the first, is progress in development of high-powered modes of coherent radiation of beams of energy, for which the development of the so-called free-electron laser is one of the most interesting programs presently under way. The third area is a new approach to the mastery of living processes, for which micro-biotechnology is an important but ultimately relatively minor feature. If one were obliged to identify some single area of human activity in which all three elements perform an interdependent function, one must choose man's colonization of the Moon and Mars as exemplary.

Thermonuclear fusion means the potential for accelerating space vessels toward relativistic speeds in powered interplanetary flight. This is indispensable for manned exploration of our solar system, and for later manned flights beyond our solar system; it is also indispensable for significant human travel from Earth-orbit to orbital positions for creating and maintaining an Earth-like artificial environment in large, inhabited chambers on the Moon or Mars. The power of the high-powered laser and particle-beam is the indispensable tool by which to capture energy produced by thermonuclear fusion for work in space or work done by human colonies on the Moon or Mars. For extended space-travel and for colonies on the Moon or Mars, we must produce the food travelers and colonists require, a task which recommends progress in biotechnology to us.

As to the Creator's purpose in beckoning us into space, we must wait until we reach there and discover what tasks await us. We do know at present that certain scientific researches cannot be completed except in exploration of space, researches with important benefits for man on Earth. It is sufficient for us to know that it is our destiny to explore and colonize nearby space, and that we shall do so during the course of the next century, provided mankind does not collapse into a dark age of neo-Malthusian irrationalism and bestiality now rampantly insurgent about us today. We also know that as we look upward to those impending tasks of space-exploration, men and women are uplifted in spirit to think of man as Man in Creation, and to slip less easily into the condition of beast-men squabbling over patches of mud in the swamps of Earthly life.

We also know in advance, as the limited but important accomplishments of NASA show us already, that the mustering of science to solve the problems of man's exploration of space will increase greatly our power to master problems confronting us on Earth.

To build the commitments upon which a durable peace can be established, we must adopt goals and tasks which reach deep into the coming century. First, we must establish universal justice on Earth for all nations and peoples, a work which must include the establishment of economic justice for all nations. This will require approximately two generations before the

grandchildren of today's youth in the poorest nations can be lifted to a state of self-sufficient equality. This is a task spanning approximately 50 years. At the same time, over a longer span, we must take steps toward man's colonization of nearby space, a task which aids us in looking dimly but realistically about a century ahead. If the two superpowers, and other nations as well, can adopt such common aims for mankind, the habits acquired over 50 to 100 years of collaboration may be reasonably expected to bring forth a new level of culture upon our planet. Mankind always requires large tasks which lift the individual's and nation's perception of self-interest above the petty and hedonistic squabbles of venal individuals.

It has been and continues to be my proposal that the negotiation of agreement on the new strategic doctrine be the foundation for developing agreement for collaboration on these two larger tasks of the next hundred years.

My discussions of these matters with Soviet representatives affirmed what I know by other means. The Soviet government has no serious technical disagreement with any part of the strategic package I have outlined. The military doctrine I have proposed is consistent, in terms of military science, with what the Soviet school of Marshal Sokolovsky has adopted as its war-winning doctrine for approximately 20 years. The feasibility of the new species of strategic defensive weapons-systems is well-known to Soviet circles including Academician Velikhov and Major-General Basov; the Soviet Union is now working at the utmost speed to develop and deploy such weapons-systems. As a matter of economic science, the Soviet Union would not argue against the desirability of technology-transfer to developing nations—despite the fact that the Soviet Union has been the bitterest and most stubborn opponent of permitting developing nations to employ nuclear energy. Nor does the Soviet Union oppose scientific cooperation in development of thermonuclear fusion and space exploration. Also, the Soviet Union would agree that the technologies involved in beam-weapons systems, if spilled over into the economy, would prompt a significant rise in the productive powers of labor.

Nonetheless, the Soviet government rudely, even violently, rejected the President's offer of March 23rd. During the middle of April, "the highest political level" ordered a termination of discussions with me, and has subsequently classed me as the embodiment and leader of the "right wing" in the United States. However, before breaking off discussions, Soviet channels reported to me the Soviet government's reasons for rejecting the President's offer.

"Yes, the doctrine would work as you suggest," it was conceded, "but we will never accept it." The explanation for Soviet rejection of even noncommittal exploratory negotiations was given precisely and point by point.

- 1) "The Soviet Union will never negotiate strategic policy with an adversary. The United States is our adversary."
- 2) "The Soviet Union will never negotiate with President Reagan."

This is accurate. It has been consistent Soviet policy never to negotiate with President Reagan since the early summer of 1982, at the time Yuri Andropov was formally adopted as successor to Leonid Brezhnev. The Soviet Union has made purely cosmetic offers of willingness to negotiate with the U.S.A., including back-channel discussions with Henry A. Kissinger, but has never made any effort at substantive negotiations with President Reagan. It is waiting to negotiate with one of President Reagan's seven pro-Nuclear Freeze opponents among leading candidates for the Democratic presidential nomination. The Soviet leadership has so far adopted the view that to negotiate substantive matters with the President might give Ronald Reagan's reelection campaign the kind of "statesmanlike" credibility with voters which Richard Nixon gained from the 1972 SALT and ABM treaty negotiations.

- 3) "The economic spill-overs of these weapons technologies will work as you propose. However, because of our economic bottlenecks, your country would leap ahead of us, and that we will never tolerate."

The great fear in Moscow is that the United States might resume the relative economic strength it enjoyed during the middle of the 1960s. It is implied that under those conditions, the United States could afford to outrun the Soviet Union in military spending—whereas, at present, the Soviet economy is outspending the United States on military accounts. The Soviet leadership is fearful of the United States' potential to pull off an economic miracle of recovery through aid of a high-technology crash- program like the early NASA effort.

### ***Evaluation of the Soviet Rejection***

I interpreted the orders to break off discussions with me as crucial evidence of Soviet intentions to move quickly toward a thermonuclear confrontation with the United States, and so informed my friends in the U.S. government. I forecast that the Soviets would begin to escalate on a countdown toward a thermonuclear confrontation as early as August 1983. Events proved my spring 1983 forecast of such a Soviet posture to be correct; the countdown toward thermonuclear confrontation began during August, and has been escalating in various sections of the globe ever since.

The general evidence I had available in making and submitting this evaluation was essentially as follows.

The Soviet leadership knew that as long as superpower negotiations were defined within the setting of Nuclear Deterrence doctrines, that a new missiles crisis before the end of 1983 was

probable, and virtually certain by spring of 1984. Unless some qualitatively new dimension in superpower negotiations occurred before December 1983, a chain-reaction of measures and counter-measures leading to a global missiles crisis as early as 1984 was almost unstoppable. Therefore, in flatly rejecting even exploratory negotiations on the basis offered by the President, the Soviets had manifestly committed themselves to an early thermonuclear confrontation. They had not merely accepted such a confrontation; they were consciously seeking its occurrence.

Additionally, there are several leading reasons the Soviet leadership views 1984 as the year of opportunity for probable Soviet success in accomplishing an historically decisive humiliation of the United States.

- 1) *The Shift in the Military Balance.* The Soviet Union is presently ahead of the United States in strategic military capabilities. This margin of Soviet advantage is such that the Soviet Union has more or less the acceptable military margin of calculated risk to launch a pre-emptive thermonuclear assault upon the United States, unless the United States combined missile forces were on full-alert status and the United States operating under a launch-under-attack policy.

The key point on which to concentrate to understand this Soviet advantage is the relevance of the Soviet SS-20 as an anti-submarine-warfare weapon, which is the principal military function of such a weapon within the Soviet missile arsenal taken as a whole. Simply, the nominal margin of U.S. missile strength *vis-à-vis* the Soviet forces is the submarine-launched second-strike arsenal. If this element of U.S. capabilities were eliminated, the relatively aged U.S. land-based missile arsenal is at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage under conditions of Soviet first-strike assault. I won't go through the basic calculations, which military professionals here know at least as well as I do. I emphasize only that by aid of modern tracking and trailing of the handful for NATO nuclear submarines actually deployed at any one time, and the ability to locate those submarines' position within a range of 10,000 to 100,000 square kilometers, MIRVed SS-20s are an ideal counterforce capability against the nuclear-submarine fleet of the Atlantic Alliance, and are not the portion of the Soviet arsenal indicated for deployment against Western Europe.

- 2) Except for Southeast Asia, Korea, and Japan, the entirety of the section of the world economy under rule of the Bretton Woods monetary institutions is presently gripped by a deepening economic depression, which tends to prevent the United States and Western Europe from mobilizing to restore the military balance with Soviet forces.

The October 1983 *Quarterly LaRouche-Riemann Forecast* for the U.S. economy identifies the evidence proving that the reported 1983 economic upswing in the United States is a

statistical hoax concocted chiefly by officials at the Federal Reserve System. Relative to 1982 levels, the physical output of the U.S. economy contracted by about 4 percent during 1983. The Federal Reserve System's fraudulent report turned a decline in the value of U.S. steel output into a 36 percent reported rise. It overstated auto production for the first three quarters of 1983 by 24 percent; it understated the inflation rate by 300 percent; and reported the worst U.S. food production since World War II as a "record year" for agriculture. Meanwhile, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics dropped more than 1 million unemployed from the labor force, to create the appearance of a decline in unemployment rates, and understated the gross cumulative level of unemployment by 100 percent. I do not suggest that President Reagan was in any way responsible for this hoax; I have evidence that the President was in fact the chief intended victim of this deliberate fraud by the Federal Reserve, as part of a scheme to induce him to tolerate policies and conditions he would not have tolerated had he been given honest figures.

The U.S. economy itself has been on a rollercoaster of ups and downs, overall downward, since Volcker introduced his policies in 1979. This, aggravated by the collapse of world trade under pressure of IMF conditionalities, has plunged the world into an economic depression resembling that of 1929–31.

- 3) Since the summer of 1982, the world has been walking along the crumbling brink of a 1931-style international financial collapse. Contrary to news-media accounts, the heart of this problem is not the approximately \$750 billion foreign debt of developing nations, but the nearly \$10 trillion of combined public and private debt of the industrial nations. We are presently at the brink of a chain-reaction collapse in North America and Western Europe, which would wipe out between \$1 and \$2 trillion of paper values in the first wave of a 1931-style collapse.

In the effort to delay by perhaps a quarter or two more the threatened collapse in the northern hemisphere, bankers maddened by desperation are ferociously looting the developing nations, creating in Latin America and elsewhere an economic, social, and political crisis of profound and ominously immediate strategic implications. The looting of the developing sector today, under the guidance of Lord Peter Carrington's firm, Kissinger Associates, Inc., is taking on the dimensions of horror of the Nazi looting of occupied countries during World War II.

- 4) The political system of alliances centered upon the United States is crumbling. The Middle East and North Africa are being destroyed. The subcontinent of Asia is now in the opening phase of a massive and potentially generalized destabilization through deployments of various integrist insurgencies from Iran and Europe. The Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia are presently either undergoing destabilization, or are

targeted for early eruptions of Islamic fundamentalist destabilization. The Republic of Korea is now massively targeted for early destabilization and possible outbreak of renewed war. Latin America's relationship to the United States is being demolished under the influence of the policies of Lord Carrington's Kissinger Associates, Inc. Within Western Europe and North America, the political will of governments and the alliance itself are being ruined by the combined impact of Western Europe treachery and the Nuclear Freeze and Peace movements.

- 5) The United States is presently seized by the inward-looking delusions traditionally associated with a presidential election campaign, in which the majority of the President's opponents are variously Democratic and Republican liberals, massively supported by the news media generally, who openly proclaim Andropov the peace-lover and Reagan the warmonger.

These five conditions add up to what must be seen from Moscow as an historic strategic opportunity. For, if President Reagan were reelected, beginning November 1984, he would without doubt unleash a massive economic mobilization modeled significantly on the precedent of the 1939–43 period, to the effect that the Soviet strategic advantage of the present moment would rapidly evaporate. This present period of twelve months ahead as a period of the United States' greatest strategic vulnerability to a Soviet thermonuclear confrontation which has ever existed is or likely to exist in the foreseeable future. If the United States is sharply confronted now, some in Moscow delude themselves, it will lack the political will to do anything but capitulate massively to Soviet demands. It might be imagined in Moscow, therefore, that through such concessions the Soviet Union could secure for itself a proverbial thousand years of global military hegemony.

I shall not present here the extent of the intelligence which I had at my disposal this past April and May when I assembled my evaluation of Soviet response to the President's March 23rd address. It is irrelevant, for our purposes here, to examine the reasons which, during April of this year, prompted me to select August as the point that the Soviet escalation toward thermonuclear confrontation would begin.

The point to be made is that there is no hope of avoiding thermonuclear war during the period ahead unless the Soviet leadership enters into negotiations of the sort implied in the President's March 23rd announcement. It should also be clear that the Soviet leadership will continue to reject such negotiations as long as Moscow believes that it might gain a historic strategic political victory in the course of the ongoing escalation toward confrontation now in progress.

Since April of this year, and most emphatically since this past August, there has been a raging battle within the leading Washington circles between those forces which agree more or less with my evaluation and those opposing forces which accept the strategic assessment offered variously by Henry Kissinger and leading circles of the U.S. State Department. Up until the terrorist killing of nearly 300 soldiers in Beirut and the murder of Prime Minister Bishop of Grenada, those who more or less shared my view were in a decided minority. Now, the correlation of factional forces has shifted significantly in favor of my strategic estimation. I do not know whether those who share my general outlook are presently a majority, but the actions taken in Grenada show that the present direction of developments in Washington, and among the American citizens on the streets around the nation, is shifting toward my view.

The essential problem is that for a long time, since the middle of the 1960s, the United States has ceased to be a politically credible strategic force in the eyes of other nations and its own citizenry. The Kissinger years and the disaster of David Rockefeller's Carter administration bequeathed a disaster to the Reagan administration, a disaster which the President did not begin to significantly reverse until his address of March 23rd. Now, by his stubborn defense of the principle of sovereignty of nations in the case of Lebanon, and his assistance to the threatened state of the Caribbean in the case of the Soviet military *coup d'état* in Grenada, the President has begun to win back the lost credibility of the U.S. government from among growing portions of the citizenry and among portions of the United States' allies. Congressmen long stubborn opponents of the President on these issues are beginning to capitulate begrudgingly to the President under pressures from an angry citizenry in the streets.

With this renewed credibility, and a clearer picture of Soviet posture and intentions than ever before, it is probable that the President will proceed in the direction of actions which have the twofold effect of causing the Soviet government to rethink the matter of thermonuclear confrontation, and to consider more seriously the offer which the President made on March 23rd. The best way to persuade the Soviet Union to accept the new strategic doctrine of the United States is to act to implement that doctrine now.

Let those of us more fully aware of the dangers threatening us act now to influence the governments of Western Europe and North America to enter jointly into a cooperative economic mobilization modelled upon the U.S. mobilization of 1939–43, and in that context reequip and retrain our defensive forces with the new kind of strategic and tactical defensive technologies we are discussing here today.

Is it still possible to avoid thermonuclear war? No one on Earth knows. Perhaps it is already too late, but we have no available course of action but to try. Nothing can possibly succeed



except negotiations on the basis of the strategic doctrine of March 23rd. As we say in the vernacular-of the United States, "It's our best shot; let's put everything we have into making that effort succeed."

### ***A New Policy for the Alliance***

I conclude this presentation with one final point, a point most appropriately made among those assembled on the historic soil of Italy, the Italy of St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, Dante Alighieri, Nicholas of Cusa, and Leonardo da Vinci.

I do not think that what I have to say in this final point can be rightly described in any way as chauvinistic. I have demonstrated often enough my love for the nations and people of the Arab world, of victimized Iran, of Pakistan, of India, of Africa, and Southeast Asia, my concern for the well-being of the people of China, and my affectionate respect for the people and achievements of Japan. Yet, that love and respect does not permit me to blind myself to the special and precious contributions to civilization of Western European Judeo-Christian culture.

Amid the ruins of the evil which St. Augustine rightly recognized in the Roman Empire, and the sordid degeneracy of Byzantium, on this soil of Italy there arose around the persons of St. Ambrose and St. Augustine, an affirmation of the highest truths of both Apostolic Christianity and of the Judaism of Moses and Philo of Alexandria. Expressed in that precious Latin term, *flioque*, was a conception of the Creator, of the lawful ordering of our universe, and of man's place in that universe under the Creator. Although much evil has invaded and sometimes ruled European nations since St. Augustine lived, the heritage of St. Augustine and the *flioque* has produced repeatedly new insurgencies of the noblest qualities of which mortal man has shown himself capable.

When the work of Charlemagne was destroyed, in the evil dark age of the 14th century, around the political heirs of the great Dante, there arose, centered in Italy during the 15th century, the greatest efflorescence of culture which has ever occurred at any known time in any place. Centered around the powerful personality of the great scientist and lawgiver Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, there arose a new conception of political society, of universal natural law, and an eruption of scientific progress unlike anything the world has seen since. Those of us who share that heritage—in Western Europe, and in the Americas—are both the sons and daughters of St. Augustine and of Cusa's circle of collaborators. Today, as that great heritage seems almost at the verge of extinction in Italy, as in most of Europe and North America, it is our duty to remember who we are, what heritage we represent, and to act as those great predecessors of ours would have acted were they alive to act today.

In the great struggle between East and West which grips the world today, we should think back to the city of Florence in 1439, when the friends of Cusa met with the representatives of the Paleologues to the purpose of uniting East and West under the common banner of the *filioque*. Poor Russia, brutalized by the worst of Byzantium and emerging from the long dark ages of the Mongol Yoke, then served as the chief bastion for the destruction of the great ecumenical agreement made at Florence. Despite the efforts of Russia's great heroes of attempted "Westernization," the dark grip of the brutalized past grips most of that nation still today.

Among Soviet spokesmen I have met, there are many who are likeable individuals, toward whom as individuals I could wish nothing but good. Yet, even in those cases, as I look deep into their minds, there is a great emptiness there, a lack of that ennobled conception of man's divine potentialities which we should associate with the tradition of *filioque* in Western culture. Whether they profess to be religious or not, they are gripped by a dark, paganist kind of mysticism, which makes them sophisticated and rational on the surface but confused savages underneath. They are incapable of that special quality of love for mankind which those of us share who walk in the tradition of Augustine, Dante, and Cusa.

This presents us with a twofold problem, a twofold task. Our first task is that of reaffirming and defending that precious spark of continuity we associate with the tradition of Augustine. We must do that, not only for ourselves, not only for our nations, for our posterity, but for the sake of all humanity. Imagine the fate of a world in which this spark were lost to humanity! That we could not tolerate at any price. Yet, while defending this heritage against such brutish mysticisms as we encounter as commonplace in the East, we must extend to the people of the East that same ecumenical policy which the Council of Florence displayed more than 500 years ago.

Nations, in and of themselves, are not worth defending at any price. What must be defended is that heritage, a heritage embodied in those nations and peoples which further it. If we are moral, if we share that heritage efficiently, the ugly work of warfare, when unavoidable, must never be anything but a necessary, incidental means to that higher purpose.

We are immediately the bearers of more than 2,500 years of republican tradition since Solon of Athens, of nearly 2,000 years of the heritage of Philo of Alexandria and Apostolic Christianity, the tradition most efficiently identified by the single Latin word, *filioque*. If that precious tradition, that spark, were to be removed from among nations, mankind as a whole would degenerate into the moral condition of beasts.

Our mortal lives are as nothing in themselves. We are born. We live briefly. We die. The memories of pleasures enjoyed in the flesh die in our graves with us. It is only that of our

mortal existence which outlives us, which serves a higher, continuing purpose, which makes our having lived worthwhile. The conception of man and society implicit in that Latin word, *filioque*, expresses everything which coincides with such a higher purpose, the only quality which makes the entire human species worth saving. To defend that principle, the higher purpose of our individual existence, there is no price too high if that price must be paid.

Let us rise above the conception of military alliances which our nations have practiced during the past decades. Let us become nations united to a common higher purpose, the purpose expressed by our precious tradition. Let us do what is necessary to fulfill the requirements of that purpose. With that, I believe that I am understood by most here. I need say no more.