

Part II: The Interim Strategic Situation

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*Part II concludes Lyndon LaRouche's commentary on Peter Paret's recently published book, Clausewitz and the State. Part I, which emphasized Clausewitz's failure to ally with European and American humanist-republican forces against Britain and the Soviet Union's similar strategic blunder today, was published December 19 in Volume 4, Number 51 of **Executive Intelligence Review**.*

In summary, then, none of the institutionalized leading political forces of continental Europe corresponded to a significant force with which humanists could ally on the basis of a community of principle. Kant's proposed basis for the peace of Europe, independent republics in the humanist sense of republic, did not exist. How does one steer a policy course under such circumstances? That is the basic problem of strategy we have to consider here.

The United States, faced from a distance with the same predicament confronting the Prussian reformers, did rather well under Washington and John Adams, and managed in a poorer fashion under Jefferson. The United States attempted to place its margin of power in the balance, to thus shift the course of events into directions to the relative advantage of the security and development of the American System. Prussia was in a more difficult position, especially considering the defects of the monarchy and the aggravating defects of the monarch.

Such particular facts of the situation help to pose the questions, but the answers cannot be given on that level of perception. We must refer our investigation to the "transfinite," so to speak. Only there, as Clausewitz failed to understand, do genuine policy-solutions exist to be discovered.

Throughout more than a thousand years of European civilization's history, there has been a persisting struggle between two tendencies: on the one side, the humanist factions centering around Neoplatonic humanists and the policy of urban, technology-oriented economic and social development; on the other side, the anti-humanist factions, the forces of the

Inquisition, of monetarism, and of various expressions of Malthusianism. The development of European and North American industrial capitalism, beginning in 16th-century Tudor England, has been the central thrust of humanist or republican policies. The English throne, since the accession of Charles II, and most notably since the accession of the Orange and Guelph houses to that throne, for approximately three centuries, has been the principal bastion of anti-humanist evil in the world.

The underlying determinant of reality in the civilized world has been and remains the current shaping of the conflict between these two factional tendencies. The proper cornerstone of humanist and republican policies has been and must be that of acting to strengthen the influence of the humanist currents at the expense of the London-centered anti-humanist currents under all conditions. In the simplest cases, this policy dictates alliances based on community of principle among republics and humanist-republican forces. More generally, it means to act to strengthen the humanist-republican influences in all states.

This Clausewitz and his associates did not comprehend, and this principle he and his associates profoundly violated both in practice and in Clausewitz's simplistic analysis of the political side of strategy.

It is on this same point that Soviet foreign policy has been downright imbecilic at many crucial junctures. The Soviets' current course, of *de facto* subordination of Soviet policy to British interests, represents a nadir in that record.

War and Peace

Peace between the United States and the Soviet Union can be achieved on a durable basis because, unlike England of the past three centuries, both the United States and the Soviet Union are organically committed to the principles of a humanist republic. However, general war between the "two superpowers" remains dangerously possible because the two powers are not presently committed to the indicated perception of potential relations between them, and because anti-humanist elements exist and recurrently tend to become dominant in their respective foreign policies.

In the long term, a state of war has existed for more than a thousand years between humanist and anti-humanist forces of the Mediterranean and adjoining nations. There can be no durable peace between those two forces; the one must subjugate the other to its policy. Repeatedly, this has resulted in actual wars, either as direct conflicts between representatives of the opposing policies—as in the American Revolution—or because of chaotic and confused alignments of forces which indirectly reflect the same issues. A state of non-war can exist between humanist and British-led forces, but no durable positive basis for permanent peace can exist between those opposing forces.

In short, it ought to be the policy of the United States (and of the Soviet leadership) that Britain must be conquered to the effect of forcing Britain to abandon now and forever those monetarist and related anti-humanist policies which have made England the persisting force for world evil throughout most of the past three centuries.

Admittedly, to a certain extent, our indicated policy of positive peace between the Soviet Union and the United States is not realizable on the basis of the policies of the two states at this moment. On the Soviet side, the leading circles there are obsessively seized by a pathologically simplistic and ignorant conception of the nature of the conflicts between capitalist and socialist forms of ownership of the basic means of production. On the side of the United States, the ideological heritages of Versailles and Cold War anti-communism are the lesser part of the problem in fact. The principal problem on the United States' side is that the "environmentalist" and related anti-humanist policies of the British-aligned forces in that nation represent an impulse which leads toward probable early general war with the Soviet Union.

Once the United States resumes a "Hamiltonian" policy toward national banking, domestic capital formation, and technological progress, the world impact of such U.S. policies is, in fact, in the vital interests of the Comecon nations *as states*. If the Soviet leadership is, in turn, capable of understanding the basis for and implications of that point, a positive basis for durable peace exists.

On this point, certain vectors of Vatican policy are significantly more sophisticated and sound than the policies articulated in the capitals of the industrial capitalist nations. An important element in the international leadership of the Catholic Church has brought forward the ecumenical principle for relations among states first systematically developed by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. Under the influence of such thinking, the Catholic Church in Poland has most recently contributed a most positive proposal toward the strengthening of the socialist republic of that nation, proposing to the state that the government act to check the spread of pornography and other elements of London-centered subversion of Polish society which the Polish Catholic hierarchy rightly perceives represent a hideous attempted destruction of the Polish state by evil forces. We are not suggesting that this is the only policy to be associated with the church hierarchy in Poland, but merely the fact that the cited element, featured in the wake of Gierek's meeting with Pope Paul VI, as an expression of a humanist ecumenical outlook from within the church.

The principle of peace-winning is a policy of fostering within one's own and other nations those policy impulses which bring the humanist element to the fore. If peace-winning fails, then the same policy is properly continued as a war-fighting policy, and in the determination of the conditions of peace to be imposed upon the vanquished.

Humanist Policy-Making

The Humanist principles to be emphasized for this practical purpose are the following:

1. Emphasis on scientific and technological progress as both the policy of dominant ruling institutions and in economic and social policy.
2. The education of the individual citizen to this same effect, both in respect of the citizen's productive powers and the citizen's political judgment.
3. A nation-state committed to such constitutional principles of policy-making, and to the conscious perception that such principles reinforce the distinction between man and lower forms of life is a humanist republic, *whatever specific political forms it otherwise represents*.

The humanist policy is to attempt to variously force and catalyze nations to adopt such policies of economic and related progress in their own development and in their relations with other states. Even states which are not otherwise qualified as humanist republics tend to become humanist republics through the practical and related effects of policies which express a humanist impulse. A nation experiencing the benefits of technological progress, by placing a premium upon the development of the mental powers of its citizens, by placing a premium on the investment of social surplus in technological progress in the expansion of productive capacities and outputs, has caused its population to tend to place a premium upon the creative-mental powers of the individual citizen, and to defend mutual respect among citizens on this basis. By raising the cultural level of nations and constituent portions of nations, it is possible to foster the conditions under which even bad nations tend to become humanist republics.

The paradoxes of the current United States "human rights" policies aptly illustrate the issues to be considered. On the one side, the United States demands respect for "human rights" in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Peru. Yet, at the same time, the United States government has been implicated in continued support of the fascist economic policies of Milton Friedman, *et al.* in those states, fascist economic policies which cannot be implemented without a genocidal intensity of internal economic repression and not without political repression correlative to that economic policy. To that point, U.S. "human rights" policy is at best disastrously unworkable and, in effect, pathetically hypocritical.

Worse, by decreeing a neo-Malthusian policy for these nations, as does Robert McNamara's World Bank, the effect is to abort technological progress and, even worse, to force a resort to bestializing conditions of primitive "labor-intensive" employment, modeled on the Nazi forced-labor system, where more advanced forms of employment were the existing or implied norm. The bestializing effects of a World Bank austerity policy signify that the United States

could not have a policy favoring human rights in developing and other nations unless the United States first of all repudiated and worked to destroy the World Bank of Mr. Robert McNamara.

Yet the United States is not to be solely singled out for criticism on this issue. The effective foreign policy of the Soviet Union has been, if anything, more hypocritical. What has been the Soviet Union's position on the issues of world monetary reform? It has placed itself in effect on the side of the culpable London merchant bankers and those bankers' allies! It has associated itself in the balance of power with the most bestially reactionary forces!

How does the Soviet leadership rationalize such bestially hypocritical policies? The Soviets argue that "only socialism represents a true solution to the problems of oppressed peoples." Hence, the short-term realpolitiking perceptions of Soviet state interests proceed with blind indifference to one or the opposite sort of capitalist policies, up to the point that a "national liberation struggle" appears within reach of securing a socialist constitution for this or that developing nation.

On that point, the Soviets are guilty of the same political imbecility, to the most pathetically reductionist notion of the reality—the "objectivity" of existing states—and do nothing in effect to apply Soviet weight and influence in the balance of world affairs to cause the promotion of a humanist policy within states of the capitalist sector. This they justify on the basis of their simplistic perception of the issues between socialism and capitalism—a delusion of which the case of Peking ought to have disabused them.

The Soviets so far refuse to see that the emergence of a humanist industrial-capitalist policy in the United States and other key OECD nations represents the only possible basis for avoiding general war in the intermediate term. Thus, the Soviets relieve themselves of the responsibility for discovering how they can employ their power to foster the indicated shifts in policy within leading capitalist nations, how they should deploy their power to strengthen the position of factions of developing and industrialized capitalist states struggling to establish a humanist policy of high-technology-centered economic expansion. Rather, in the most recent period, they have aligned themselves on balance with the world's worst reactionaries, the City of London merchant bankers and British intelligence.

The Strategic Situation

All of the notable developments of the last few weeks belong potentially to two different universes, two worlds of mutually exclusive geometries. One of these geometries involves the potentiality of the City of London's hegemony in a reorganization of the existing monetarist order. That is the geometry of Hell, a geometry of deep depression, hyperinflationary austerity, a period of intensified Cold War, and the rather early onset of general

thermonuclear war. The other geometry is based on a resumption of a Hamiltonian domestic and foreign policy by the United States, in alliance with humanist-republican forces of France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, and other nations. If the Soviets collaborate with such a geometry, that geometry is one of secure world peace under the hegemonic rule of the world by a combination of republics dedicated to humanist policies of high-technology economic expansion.

That perception of the present moment as a branching-point in which the two geometries overlap in a singularity is the only truly competent basis for policy formulation. One must choose which of the two geometries one desires. Then one must shape one's actions not according to any presumed consequences of those actions as such, but according to the effect those actions have in establishing the relative hegemony of one geometry over the other. It is only in that way, by first determining which geometry one is acting to bring into hegemony, that the consequences of the action can be assessed in a more particular way.

In the final analysis, the choice is a choice between energy policies. In social processes as in nature otherwise, the lawful course of development is determined by the change in negentropy effected.

If we appropriately increase the energy-density of world social systems, by emphasizing fission and fusion technologies, this increase in negentropy ensures the desired, humanist-republican geometry. Reciprocally, the promotion of the humanist-republican order is indispensable to realize the negentropy of production humanism now requires.