

## Part 1: The Interim Strategic Situation

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December 6, 1977

*[Published in **Executive Intelligence Review**, Volume 4, Number 51, December 19, 1977. View [PDF of original](#) at the LaRouche Library.]*

*The following analysis was issued on December 6 by Lyndon H. LaRouche Jr., U.S. Labor Party chairman. This is Part 1 of a two-part series, to be continued in **EIR** No. 52.*

At the moment, the Soviet leadership is behaving very foolishly on balance, permitting itself to be manipulated by British intelligence networks almost to the point of resembling a puppet on a British string. In respect to the Begin-Sadat discussions, Moscow is being lured into a British intelligence caper around the so-called “Rejection Front.” In France, Soviet stupidity is more glaring, with the KGB being caught ham-handed as patsies for the British intelligence-created and controlled Corsican-Basque-Breton-Polisario terrorist groups, a circumstance symptomized by the role of British SIS agent “Kim” Philby, planted within the Arbatov-allied forces within the KGB.

Although key continental West European governments, as well as the U.S. State Department, are honestly attempting to reach a common understanding of common strategic interests with Moscow on these and other issues, the efforts of such agencies as the U.S. State Department are significantly undermined by the errors of the U.S. and other governments, errors which contribute to the Soviets being more easily manipulated by British SIS.

Although the State Department Mideast policy as known to us as of the past weekend ought to be supported and aided as being in the proper direction, the efforts of State and other OECD forces working for peace would be qualitatively strengthened if a better understanding of the overall strategic situation were brought into both background thinking and public discussions. It is urgent that the U.S.A., the Soviets and key continental European governments be more adequately informed concerning the underlying forces which determine the success or failure of otherwise well-intended particular efforts.

To make the points which must be made in this connection, this paper is devoted in part to a critical review of Peter Paret’s 1976 book, *Clausewitz and the State*. Although the dominant

official thinking within the Atlantic Alliance is anti-Clausewitzian, and Soviet policy is predominantly a modified version of Clausewitzian, it is the principal blunders of Carl von Clausewitz which represent the proper point of departure for a fruitful criticism of both Atlantic and Soviet strategic perceptions.

The object of this paper is to afford leading U.S., West European and Soviet circles an insight into the *doubleness* of the current strategic configurations. That is, the particular concatenation of events, which may be viewed as the identifiable facts of the situation, belongs simultaneously to two qualitatively distinct geometries, two qualitatively distinct world-historical processes. The first such geometry involves the waning strategic configuration of the post-1943 period. The second geometry is a new strategic configuration now emerging. Taken together, the overlap of the two configurations defines a strategic branching-point in the current world historical process.

The practical significance of that apparently only abstract refinement of analysis is that the consequences of current policy actions are not predictable except as we also determine which of the two geometries we shall be operating within in the short term and intermediate term immediately before us. The same particular action can have two qualitatively different, opposite outcomes, depending upon our choice between the two geometries, depending upon which of the two geometries is consciously or at least implicitly governing our overall strategic judgmental processes.

The doubleness of the Begin-Sadat negotiations illustrates the general point. It is clear that the Begin-Sadat negotiations might lead to a separate Israel-Egypt peace. In that case, the British might be successful, at least probably successful, in developing a sharp Soviet-NATO confrontation in the Middle East, southern Africa and, probably, also Yugoslavia—a track pointing to a new cold-war pattern and probable general thermonuclear war. However, if Begin and Sadat stick to a policy of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, and if Sadat acts as an effective surrogate for the general interests of the Arabs as a whole, the associated emergence of a high-technology Middle East economic development program will tilt the world against London's current strategic policies and toward a general emergence from economic depression into general economic prosperity and an elimination of the conditions promoting a general war danger.

Thus, the ambiguity of the courageous actions of Begin and Sadat. One cannot attribute a single consequence to this development. Two entirely different opposite consequences can emerge depending upon which general strategic policy guides the further progress of those discussions.

Clausewitz's gross strategic blunder, and the effort to rationalize that monstrous blunder in *On War*, is perhaps the most appropriate topic to be considered in building the new strategic doctrine which ought to inform U.S. and Soviet policies (among those of other relevant nations).

### ***Paret's Evaluation***

Peter Paret's treatment of Clausewitz should be viewed broadly as typifying one variant of the rationalizations advanced by the anti-Clausewitzian "utopians" in behalf of the predominant Anglo-American NATO doctrine. In contrast to the most obviously incompetent variety of RAND Corporation utopian arguments, Paret does not summarily dismiss Clausewitz but seeks to neutralize traditional readings of *On War* by more insidious means. He attempts to make a case for the irrationalist element in political and military strategy through the aid of an apparently exhaustive and scholarly reevaluation of Clausewitz's work as a whole.

This effort of Paret's is aided by two features of his undertaking. The more obvious of these two features is the characteristic feature of his historiographic style in the cited text. He combines extensive and, in part, useful, scholarship with an overall banality and sophomoric blundering in respect to the connective tissue and philosophical interpolations he stirs in with the scholarship itself. His thoroughness with respect to the subject of Clausewitz as such is in contrast to his shallow ignorance of pre-1806 European and North American history, and his sophomoric misunderstanding of the principal philosophical currents affecting the leading figures and movements of Clausewitz's lifetime. The second feature of Paret's effort is his overlooking of the fact that the policies of the vom Stein circles of reformers, whose outlook Clausewitz typifies in the main, are characterized by the worst strategic blunder made in all modern history. Ignoring the fact of that blunder aids Paret in equating the irrational element in Clausewitz's doctrine with Paret's own neo-Clausewitzian doctrine of strategic irrationalism.

The blunder of vom Stein *et al.* is efficiently summarized by way of the following account.

Prior to 1789–1792, the thrust of the policy of European humanists was for an anti-British alliance along the lines of the League of Armed Neutrality. Brissot and other French leaders of Benjamin Franklin's allies were committed to a policy of seeking alliance with Frederick the Great's Prussia, a view reciprocated by the French-oriented Frederickan court circles and by the soundly anti-Voltairean Frederick himself. This French humanist policy toward Frederickan Prussia was advanced with included awareness of the reprehensible rural backwardness of Prussia itself; it was assumed by the French humanists that the economic power of France, then the world's most advanced industrial power, hitched to Prussia and

other parts of Europe, would foster economic (i.e., urban) progress to the effect of organically preparing appropriate social transformations.

On the German side of this humanist effort, the anti-British object was to employ the military strength of Prussia as the nucleus of a German struggle against post-Joseph II Austro-Hungary, to establish a confederation which would be the first step toward a German republic. In Germany, the impulse was divided between those most advanced humanists of the Rhine, Benjamin Franklin's admirers and followers, and the followers of Leibniz's networks, who aimed for Republican forms of government on the American model, and those who pursued the older humanist republican conception, the Machiavellian conception, of republics developing under the leadership of a humanist prince.

It is relevant that Paret completely misevaluates the influence of Machiavelli for all European republicans. Paret dwells significantly on Clausewitz's favorable response to Fichte's treatment of Machiavelli, but approaches this as if Fichte were more or less resurrecting Machiavelli from obscurity. He ignores the fact, or is simply ignorant of it, that since the translation of Machiavelli's writings into English during the Tudor period, Machiavelli had been continuously a central influence among all European humanist factions. This gross blunder of Paret's is coordinate with his pathetic description of what he terms "neo-humanism."

A coordinate feature of the humanist policy, mentioned but not understood by Paret, is the Kantian proposal for a world-system of humanist republics. This notion Paret cites and ignorantly ridicules, not understanding the content or circumstances of Kant's proposal for universal peace on that basis.

In general, the continental European humanists' conception of republics, developed under the auspices of princes (e.g., their policies toward Louis XVI and Austria's Joseph II), had been connected to their perception that the ignorance, the low cultural level of the general populations did not permit the direct approach to the commonwealth form of republic written about in 17th century England and realized in the United States. Although 18th-century France became the most advanced industrial power in Europe (partly because of the stagnation policies prevailing in Guelph-ruled England), the average cultural level of the French peasant was below that of the English rural population, to say nothing of the 90-percent literate population of the United States. The humanists of continental Europe therefore adopted a Colbertian policy of preparing the way for humanist popular republics (democratic republics) through programs of monarchical industrial development, which they envisaged as bringing the general population up to the cultural level required for the commonwealth form of republic, the democratic republic.

In opposition to humanist policies, the English liberals adopted a twofold foreign policy. Wherever possible, the English liberals proposed a “cultural relativist” policy, a policy of shoring up atavistic cultural institutions. The object of this was to enhance the economic hegemony of a stagnating English industrial economy by means of enforced relative backwardness abroad—as emphasized inclusively in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*. Where this was not feasible, the British pursued a foreign policy of *sans-culottism*, of using the cultural backwardness of the peasantry and lumpenproletarian strata as a battering-ram against industrialist-capitalist factions. These two moments of British foreign policy were respectively typified by the doctrines of Hobbes and Locke.

The center of European and North American anti-British efforts had been the English-language Commonwealth Party faction, for which Benjamin Franklin emerged as the leading 18th-century spokesman, and the allied continental European faction of the followers of Colbert and Leibniz’s attacks on both Hobbes and Locke, and his correctly premised attacks on Isaac Newton as a Locke-allied fraud, who exemplify the leading humanist influences within Germany during the 18th century.

To understand modern European and American history, the American Revolution must be thought of as part of what was in fact the First World War.

The American Revolution had a double significance for the thinking of those elements of the German Reform Party out of which Clausewitz’s *On War* emerges. Most narrowly, without a study of the qualitative shift in conceptions of strategy and tactics elaborated in the American Revolution, there is no competent historical understanding of either Napoleonic tactics or the conceptions expressed in *On War*. More broadly, the European wars of the 1789–1815 period represent a British counteroffensive in the war against Britain, which the American Revolution and its allied League of Armed Neutrality represented. With the aid of both Napoleon’s follies and the follies of the Prussian Reform Party, Europe lost that war.

The revolution in the technology of warfare effected by the American Revolution was based principally on the American Federalists’ application of the principles of Machiavelli to the special advantages of the American population. The key was the fact that the North American population had the highest standard of living and most advanced popular culture of any section of European culture. This made possible a combination of regular army and militia system realizing the goals of Machiavellian republican military policy, and in a specific way.

The specific, most conspicuous American innovation was the development of the skirmish tactic against the tactical doctrine of the European line. The work of European military specialists, such as the French, von Steuben, *et al.*, fused these specifically American

innovations with the best relevant elements of European military technology. This was possible because of the cultural superiority of the American infantryman and militiaman, which fostered emphasis on greater independence of the individual soldier in combat and the possibility of coordinate innovations in deployments.

These lessons of the American Revolution inevitably had their most immediate impact in France. With the work of Carnot, and French adaptation of the citizen-soldier principle to warfare, the elements of the American experience were blended into the French coordination of line, column, skirmish, artillery, and cavalry, which characterized the superiority of the French military up to the end of the Napoleonic wars.

These lessons could not be interpreted simply as matters of “military technology.” The realization of new tactics depended upon new approaches to the subject of the individual soldier.

The characteristics of European military development since the 15th century had been twofold. On the one side, the emergence of the *Landsknechte* from such experiences as the Swiss Eidgenossenschaft had forced the notions of the roles of three arms: infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The specific feature of the *Landsknechte* companies, battalions, and regiments was the use of massed infantry shock tactics, made possible by the development of basic foot-soldier drill, a form of drill which was designed to transform an ignorant peasant recruit rather quickly into part of an effective combat unit.

By situating the peasant in a *Haufe*, with the most experienced infantrymen in the front lines of the massed infantry battalion assaults, the ignorant peasant was compacted into a formation which controlled his combat role to the desired effect. The development of drill enabled these compacted companies, battalions, and regiments of infantry to be maneuvered as units of combat and to maintain combat potential during the line of march.

The improvement in firearms during the 17th century led to the evolution of the line. In place of the spear and halberd attack by shock infantry assaults, the firepower of relatively rapid musket fire came into dominance. The robot-like massed fire of the line and the development of such lines in echelons of deployment became the new employment of the drilled, ignorant peasant foot-soldier. The rapid deployment of columns of march into echelons of such lines of musket fire, combined with emphasis on increasing, thorough drill, the numbers of volleys per minute, were the infantry doctrine characteristics of the 18th century.

Against these tactics, the American militiaman’s skirmish-line tactics of aimed rifle fire introduced several dimensions of advantage. The point to be most emphasized is that the

skirmish line demanded a more highly cultured and more highly motivated individual soldier.

The employment of the new tactics established by the American Revolution demanded a revolution in the development of both officer corps and command structure. The break with the set-piece cabinet battle doctrines of the 18th century involved a broader conceptualization of alternative deployments and coordination of arms of battle. It required an educated officer corps, a professional officer corps based on education in military science, and a command structure whose peacetime preoccupation with education and training correlated with a coordinating general staff role in actual warfare.

The leading relevance of this discussion is that it was the combined direct and indirect influence of the American Revolution which underlies all the principal successful features of the Prussian military reforms. The case of Field Marshall Gneisenau is exemplary. Gneisenau, a captured mercenary during a large part of the American Revolution, submitted an extended report to the Prussian King on the American Revolution—which resulted in Gneisenau's relegation to relative obscurity in Silesia until the shattering of Prussian military doctrine at Jena. After Jena, the military reform faction led by Scharnhorst was able to force the reluctant Prussian monarch to bend to the influence of the non-Prussian elements of the officer corps and their Prussian sympathizers.

Education of the professional officer corps, coordination of arms and logistics, and the development of a citizen-soldier reserve in depth through universal conscription, were the features incorporated directly and indirectly from the experience and lessons of the American Revolution.

However, after 1806–1807, the anti-French, anti-republican mood in the Prussian command became virulent. Since the American Revolution was associated in the Prussian mind with either Girondism or outright Jacobinism, the Prussian staff, including the reformers, were conspicuously dishonest in not openly acknowledging their debt to the American Revolution. This was complicated by the overall composition of the reform party. Although the most productive Scharnhorst-linked elements of the reform party were deeply rooted in German humanist conceptions and traditions, their allies around the court included most prominently the pro-English faction, and the post-1807 Prussian military policy was strongly oriented toward alliance with and subsidies from England.

The reforms of vom Stein and Scharnhorst reflect the political thrust of their objectives. Their policy was a slightly diluted version of the policies of the German republicans. They envisaged Prussia as the lever for creating a German confederation which would become a republic under the rule of the Prussian monarchy. Excepting the strong thread of picaresque

aristocratic ambitions painting Clausewitz's outlook, he essentially shared the monarchical-republican political goals of the humanist element of the reform party as a whole, if with a pro-English bias.

The result of 1813–1815 was that the reformers' placing of the reformed Prussian military apparatus in alliance with the British resulted in the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, the liquidation of the reform party and all but the vestiges of its goals.

After the 1815 Treaty of Vienna, it became painfully clear to the surviving leaders of the reform party that they had lost the political war and that they themselves were being relegated to reduced status because of allegations of republican taints in their outlooks. Although the work of Scharnhorst and his protégé Clausewitz represented an advance in the doctrine of warfare, their conceptions of the political-strategic process itself had been proven pathetically incompetent by the events of the 1807–1815 period. They had succeeded in developing the policy of warfare in behalf of the Prussian state, but had utterly failed to discover the reciprocal connection between military and political policies as such. This same embedded flaw in German military doctrine assured the consequences of two world wars for that nation.

*It is not sufficient to know how to conduct a war. It is indispensable to know which wars to fight.*

### ***Implications of Clausewitz's Blunder***

Our use of the Riemann-Cantor notions of the evolution of one geometry out of another are not to be appreciated as merely heuristics for the comprehension of strategic processes. Properly understood, those conceptions are to be taken literally. The analysis of Clausewitz's crucial and devastating blunder is exemplary.

The periods 1773–1815 and 1867 to the present are comparable to this point in that both periods represent branching-point in the development of the whole course of European civilization. For both periods, the fundamental conflict, the choices which define the branching in the most basic way, are those between the American System on the one side, and what is properly termed the British System on the other.

It is in the light provided by this comparison that the follies of present Soviet foreign policy are most efficiently comprehended as comparable to the blunders of Clausewitz during the preceding period.

The American System, then and now, is most readily identified by the principles of Hamiltonian economic policy (e.g., the 1791 *Report on Manufactures*) and the associated principles of Federalist forms of democratic republic. This was not an abrupt, *ex novo* discovery of Hamilton *et al.*; a study of the work of Vergennes, Turgot and Brissot,



examination of the policies of the humanist faction of the Spanish Bourbon court, shows that Hamilton's economic conceptions were reflection into America's life of the prevailing advanced thought of all leading European humanist currents. Hamilton's correspondence with Brissot on related topics underlines this point.

There were two interdependent features of Hamilton's policies. The most fundamental feature, speaking economically, is expressed in his 1791 *Report on Manufactures*, in which the relationship among industrial progress, scientific-technological progress and development of the productive powers of labor is emphasized. The necessary correlated feature is Hamilton's national banking policy, that the credit of the nation-state must be concentrated in the control of a government, national bank, which channeled the flow of cheap credit to capital formation in agricultural, industrial, and infrastructural technological progress.

The alternative, opposite policy was that of the British circles around Lord Shelburne, Jeremy Bentham, Baring's Bank, and the British East India Company, the colonial policies of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations*, the slave-labor, make-work policies of the protofascist Bentham, and the genocidal policies of Shelburne circles' protégé, Thomas Malthus. These circles opposed general policies of technologically oriented economic development, and proposed to keep control of national and world credit in the hands of a cabal of City of London merchant-banking interests.

The central, formal, political-economic, theoretical issue between the proponents of the American System and its enemy, the British System, was the issue of ground rent (on which Karl Marx, for example, took the wrong side). Hamilton, and later Henry C. Carey, correctly argued that the "natural fecundity" of land was not the source of primary wealth. They argued, using the evidence of the American agricultural experience to prove this beyond competent dispute, that it was the improvement in newly taken land, improvements with the implicit or actual form of capital investments in means of production, which brought the relatively poor raw land into the condition of higher productivity. Thus, Hamilton and Carey correctly argued that ground rent was a chimera concocted by apologists for the British landed aristocracy. They might have added, concocted by the merchant-banker allies of the British landed aristocracy.

The present spiraling collapse of the U.S. dollar, immediately a result of collaboration of such enemies of vital U.S. interests as Blumenthal and Schlesinger with the U.S.A.'s enemies in the City of London, exemplifies the same principled issues.

Now, as during the 1789–1791 first years of the U.S. Republic, the credit of the United States is in peril on account of the growing masses of U.S. debts held by both foreign and domestic holders of U.S. dollars and other instruments. If the present monetary

arrangements and current U.S. economic policy continue, the U.S. and its dollar will be bankrupted, and the City of London will resume control of the world economy, to the effect of generally ruining the world economy and probably plunging the world into general thermonuclear war. If the U.S. economic policy abruptly changes to emphasize high-technology export centering around nuclear energy and related exports, this export policy converts the excess dollar holdings domestically and abroad into hard commodity convertible assets.

To implement such a shift in economic policy, it is essential, as Hamilton did with his National Bank policies, to create an agency through which to sop up excessive dollar claims to the desired effect. It is essential to this end to create a national banking agency whose stock becomes the axis of credit issuance to both exports and to related internal U.S. capital formation. This instrument could be either a national bank—a Third National Bank of the United States—or the immediate, intermediate-term result could be fostered by activating corresponding potentialities of the existing U.S. Export-Import Bank.

It is to the point at hand as we shall show below that this comparison shows that it is absurd to propose as an issue whether or not too many dollars are being put into circulation. If those dollars are put into circulation under British System-type policies—as the Blumenthal-Schlesinger policies determine—then there are too many dollars, far too many. If the same magnitude of monetary expansion is channeled through Hamiltonian export and domestic economic and banking policies, the expansion of the money supply is perhaps too slow. To recapitulate: the same event, the same monetary expansion of the money supply is perhaps too slow. [It depends on which of] the two alternative overall policies is governing.

The 1773–1815 branching point in European history was the immediate outgrowth of the 1773 crisis of the Geneva and Amsterdam banks. That weakening of the power of the monetarist forces was utilized by Benjamin Franklin and his French humanist (especially) allies to launch a coordinated attack on the British System. The most prominent features of that coordinated attack was the effort of Turgot, Brissot and others to launch Vergennes' industrialization policy in France and the launching of the American Revolution in North America during the same period, 1775–1776. This effort was coordinate with similar efforts in England itself, exemplified by the cases of Priestley and Thomas Paine, in Scandinavia, in Italy, in Spain, in Germany, and as far distant as the court of Catherine's Russia.

The great illusion which has prevailed to the present day concerning the events of 1773–1815 is the notion that the American Revolution and French Revolution represented the upsurge of a popularly based struggle for democracy. It is assumed that the ideas of Locke, Rousseau and Voltaire expressed such a democratic upheaval. To the same effect we have the specific, fraudulent doctrine of the “Thermidorian reaction,” to which Karl Marx partially

subscribed, and which inclusively deludes the communist parties of France and the Soviet Union to the present day.

True, in the United States case, a democratic republic was the form in which the humanist struggle expressed itself. As the leaders of the American Revolution were acutely aware, the possibility of a democratic republic in the United States existed because of the high cultural level of the American population, a cultural level vastly above that of the mass of the population in England or on the continent of Europe.

The judgment of Thomas Paine and others on this matter has been borne out by subsequent U.S. experience. Although the 18th-century American Tories were most readily identified with a section of the relatively wealthier strata, the popular base for Toryism was the more ignorant and culturally backward rural strata and illiterate strata among immigrants. For powerful and just reasons, the Federalists tended toward the view of restricting the power of the ballot to the educated strata of the population, and viewing the extension of political democracy as being conditional properly upon the promotion of popular education. It was Aaron Burr's corruption of ignorant, recently arrived immigrants, and the alliance of these forces with the most backward rural strata of the American population that enabled the London-allied New York bankers to use the Democratic Party as an instrument of not only pro-British wrecking policies but, at least on two notable occasions, outright treason.

These conditions did not exist on the European continent. Although the French peasantry was rather easily rallied to support of land reform and related measures against French rural aristocratic interests, the ignorance of the majority of the French population (in particular) meant that the conscious will of a democratic popular majority was not a useful instrument for policies generally. The humanist strategy on the continent emphasized sweeping economic and derivative social reforms within the existing monarchical order, through which to bring the condition of the general population up toward a cultural level like that of the English-speaking North American population.

This approach to the reform of the monarchy, influenced by Machiavelli to some significant extent, was datable in France to Colbert and the politiques, and earlier in the case of Louis XI. It was the aristocracy and their banker allies which were the common enemy of the independent state-monarchical interests and of humanist policies. In the strategic correlation of forces, the French aristocratic-monetarist (physiocratic) faction was the ally, and to a large extent the pawn, of the monetarist banking circles of Geneva, Amsterdam, and London.

The fight in France took the form, prior to 1789, of a struggle by the humanist faction (Turgot, Brissot *et al.*) against the Orléanist (British-allied) faction for control of the economic policies of the monarchical regime—Orléanists and their allies who were in fact

agents of the foreign powers in Geneva, Amsterdam, and London as well as of the most British elements of national aristocratic interests. Given these realities, the French Revolution as it actually unfolded was, in part, an historic mistake.

First, the French Revolution of 1789 was a destabilization operation directed by London, Amsterdam, and Geneva banking circles. Mirabeau and Necker, representing those foreign interests, acted to weaken England's chief adversary, France, from within by a naked destruction of French national credit. At the height of the political and social chaos engendered by the work of these foreign agents, the Duke of Orléans directly organized and armed the force dispatched by his own and allied foreign agents against the Bastille.

The year 1789 unleashed a combination of historically useful and historically negative developments. The breaking of the power of the rural aristocracy by the land reform vastly strengthened France, giving that nation the basis for the strength shown during the 1792–1815 period. However, with the aid of British agents-provocateurs, led by Danton and Marat, and with the conniving of the Orléanists and London, Amsterdam and Geneva agents generally, the credit of the republic (the assignats) was ruined with the aid of a political battering-ram, the slum-proletariat, Marat's *sans-culottes*.

From 1789 to 1793, the fight within France centered around the struggle between the humanists and the Rousseauvians. The former attempted to salvage the situation, to actually gain from the revolution through adopting a constitutional order based on the United States model. The Rousseauvians, who were pawns of Geneva and London, responded with the anarchist Red Terror, decapitating the principal viable leadership of French humanism.

In and of itself, Thermidor was a positive development, which unfortunately occurred too late. The potential leadership which might have led France to viable solutions had been decimated by the Red Terror. The rise of Napoleon, who was politically a fool, complicated the problem, especially with the onset of his imperial delusions.

What ensued was the result that England succeeded in causing the continental nations of the League of Armed Neutrality to fight among themselves, to the point that British hegemony was consolidated in the form of the Holy Alliance. The forces of the Commonwealth Party, the Colbertist faction, and the networks of Leibniz were crushed. This defeat of Europe was accomplished with the aid of Clausewitz and the Prussian reform party of which Clausewitz was a part.

Granted, apart from the next positive accomplishment of the French Revolution, after 1806–1815 the only state in the world which corresponded to republican interests was the United States. If the United States was not a ponderable strategic factor in continental Europe, this fact nonetheless ought to have guided all European republicans' thought.

Prussia's only sensible policy, from a Prussian or other German republican's standpoint, was to adopt a policy of neutrality towards Napoleonic France. It ought to have been clear that Germany must not ally either with England or Metternich's Austria against France. It should also have been clear that the development of Napoleonic France into a cancer from approximately 1801 onward was the result of the wars which England imposed upon Europe. If Austria allied with England on behalf of new continental wars, then Prussia should have allied with Napoleon to crush Austria quickly and securely. Prussia should have, for example, accepted Napoleon's offer of Hannover. That would have been the intelligent strategic perception of the Prussian reform faction.

Although those hypotheses have an element of the speculative in them, they do not reflect mere speculation.

On the immediate level, it was the anti-French Prussian policy inherited from the period of the reformers which caused the Prussian policy in the Franco-Prussian war, which determined the course leading into World War I, and which fostered those Franco-German conflicts through which Hitler's Germany and World War II became possible. These and other direct consequences of the follies of Clausewitz and his associates are justification enough of the illustrative observations made just above.

The more profound point to be made in this connection brings us more directly to the point concerning Riemann and Cantor made above.

If development in 1790 France had followed the course attempted by Thomas Paine and his collaborators, France would have developed along the lines of the American System model. In such a case, the duty of all European humanists would have been to ally firmly with France. Instead, because of Danton and Marat in the first instance and the Napoleonic course in the later instance, France became a progressive-and-reactionary ambiguity. It incorporated elements of humanist program, shattering the strongholds of the aristocracy in France and other nations. Yet, relative to the goals of humanism, it was also an obstacle, a cancer whose looting of Europe undermined the potential for an industrially centered humanist republican policy.

*—To be continued*